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Max Weber

and German Politics

by the same author



*Political Thought in France
from Sieyès to Sorel*



MAX WEBER

**MAX WEBER
AND GERMAN POLITICS**

a study in political sociology

by
J. P. MAYER

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Il est juste que ce qui est juste soit suivi, il est nécessaire que ce qui est le plus fort soit suivi. La justice sans la force est impuissante; la force sans la justice est tyrannique. La justice sans force est contredite, parce qu'il y a toujours des méchants; la force sans la justice est accusée. Il faut donc mettre ensemble la justice et la force; et pour cela faire que ce qui est juste soit fort, ou que ce qui est fort soit juste.

La justice est sujette à dispute, la force est très reconnaissable et sans dispute. Ainsi on n'a pu donner la force à la justice, parce que la force a contredit la justice et a dit que c'était elle qui était juste. Et ainsi ne pouvant faire que ce qui est juste fût fort, on a fait que ce qui est fort fût juste.

PASCAL.

**TO
LOLA**

Foreword

The preparations for this book date back to 1934. *Nonum prematur in annum!* I took up my old notes again in 1940 during the London blitz but I proceeded no further than to write an essay on 'Max Weber's political philosophy' which was published in Christopher Dawson's *Dublin Review* in the same year. I hesitated to continue with a book which seemed to require a greater insight into British political institutions than I then had.

Only now, after another three years' interval, being engaged in a comparative sociological survey of British political parties which the London School of Economics and Political Science has given me facilities for undertaking, I felt I had perhaps reached ground safe enough in attempting this essay in sociology of politics. I offer, therefore, this book as a first instalment of such a survey, not knowing when, if ever, the other parts will be ready.

I am deeply indebted to many friends who greatly helped me in preparing this book. I cannot mention them all, but I feel I must express my great gratitude to R. H. Tawney and H. J. Laski. While the former helped me in many discussions spread over the last nine years to clarify the general sociological framework of this book—he was also kind enough to read the manuscript in typescript—the latter generously contributed from his wide knowledge invaluable suggestions on important aspects of British constitutional life which in one case I even inserted textually. Needless to say, the findings of the book are entirely my own.

As the political writings of Max Weber are almost unknown in this country, the book had to proceed by the method of a running commentary.

The title of the book does not suggest that I intend to take a partisan stand in a discussion of 'the German problem' whose treatment occa-

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sionally seems to alternate between ignorance and sentimentality. All the same, the book may throw light—for those who can or want to see it—on a problem which here is solely reflected through the medium of Max Weber's political sociology.

Finally I wish to thank Mr. Geoffrey Faber, my publisher, without whose encouragement and pertinent advice this book would not have been written now.

J. P. M.

*London School of Economics and Political Science,
Cambridge,
October, 1943.*

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I

Introductory

This book attempts to show some, though not all, essential features of German politics, approximately between the years 1880 and 1920. These characteristic features of German politics during this period are focused in the personality of Max Weber, Germany's most outstanding political theorist during this epoch. After Bismarck no other German reflects more fully than Weber the political life of his country. To write the history of a country or a people is either a life-work or a fake. (Even as a life-work, as Élie Halévy's great example illustrates, it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve finality.) Yet to define historical structures through the medium of a great personality is within certain limits feasible, though it is important to bear in mind Goethe's dictum: *Individuum est ineffabile*.

The main sources for a study of Max Weber's political sociology are beyond any controversy. His *Jugendbriefe* and *Politische Briefe*, together with the admirable biography, written by his wife, Frau Marianne Weber, provide us with a definite intimate foundation, on which the historian may safely build. Moreover, there are his works, here mainly his *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, which, apart from his other works to which reference will be made wherever necessary, give us enough material to show how an epoch of modern German history reflects itself in thought. Here we meet as Hegel says: *Die Zeit in Gedanken gefasst*. . . .

The discussion on the structure of German politics must remain in its present controversial stage as long as it is based on too vague abstractions or generalities. What is attempted in this book is to avoid empty or biased generalizations. We shall ask ourselves: where does a man like Max Weber stand in his time? What political or socio-economical heritage did he find when he began to develop his own political

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philosophy? What was his family background? Who were his teachers, who were the friends of his generation, what books had he read? How widely had he travelled? What religious and philosophical beliefs did he hold? What was the influence women had on him? How far was his mind and life shaped by school, university, and army, those essential formative institutions from which no German has ever escaped? What was his own contribution towards the politics of his country and his age? Are there permanent lessons to be learnt from him, either negatively or positively? The latter question may raise some issues which go beyond Max Weber's span of life from which we propose mainly to illustrate the argument of this book. But sometimes the historian must, at his own peril, run the risk of becoming a retrospective prophet. (He does not like to assume this role.)¹

It has been stated above that Max Weber was the most outstanding German political theorist of the post-Bismarckian period. As such he has not only written about politics, but by the very brilliance of his writings and teaching *made* politics. Had he been a less brilliant political writer, he might in all probability have become himself a politician. Thus the following pages are not only a study in political science, but at the same time a study of its administrative application.

An interpretation of Weber's political sociology has to my knowledge never been undertaken as a separate subject of study. And yet it was Weber himself who wrote towards the end of his life: 'All ultimate questions without exception are touched by political events, even if the latter appear to be superficial.'² Hence a full appreciation of Weber's other work can in my opinion only proceed by studying his political sociology.

Weber's achievements as economic historian, as founder of a universal sociology long before sociology became the science in fashion in Mayfair, finally as a philosopher, would require separate volumes and more tranquillity of contemplation than seems possible now. Though this book is written during this war, it is conceived *sine ira et studio*: the structure of German politics as exemplified through Max Weber will remain for a long time a topic worth pondering.

II

Towards Early Mastery

The first letter with which Frau Marianne Weber opens her collection of Max Weber's youth-letters begins like this: 'I have looked at uncle Julian Schmidt's books (Julian Schmidt was a liberal author of a widely read *History of German Literature*, a friend of Gustav Freytag) and glanced through Herder's *Cid*; now I am busy with reading Machiavelli's *Principe*¹. . . ' Max Weber was then thirteen years old. Reading was the boy's only leisure occupation. When he was nine his mother says of him how 'deeply he has plunged into history and genealogy'.² At the age of fifteen he confesses to his mother his passion for reading: 'I don't flirt with girls, I don't write poems, what shall I do except read? and this I do thoroughly.'³

The range of his reading is astonishingly wide. He also begins when only sixteen years to make excerpts from books. In school—he attends a *Gymnasium* in Berlin—he reads Homer, Herodotus, Virgil, Livy, Cicero in the original languages. His vivid young mind does not easily accept an ancient text as an unquestionable authority. Of Cicero he writes to his cousin Fritz Baumgarten: 'his wavering and uncertain policy has not impressed me at all'. When Baumgarten seems to be surprised by this and similar independent comments and suggests that the young critic may have taken his impertinent wisdom from books, Max Weber insists that he has only now looked up Mommsen's *History of Rome*. At the age of fourteen he begins to learn English, and he regrets that he is not yet able to read Shakespeare's works, of which there is a copy in his parents' library.

It is quite an advantage to have parents who have a good library of their own. There was no lack of useful books for a studious boy in the library of Dr. jur. Max Weber senior, paid Councillor of the City of Berlin, National-Liberal member of the German *Reichstag* and deputy

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of the Prussian Diet as well. Max Weber senior came from a Westphalian linen merchant family in Bielefeld where in years to come his son was to study the interrelationship of capitalism and religion. His mother, Helene Weber, came from the German south-west; in her family Huguenot blood was prevalent. Perhaps her son's austere Protestantism has its roots here. Helene Weber was deeply religious—though in an unorthodox sense. She was never influenced by the rigidity of the Prussian State-Church. It was at Heidelberg that she met Max Weber senior. In Berlin Helene Weber dedicated herself—apart from the rearing of her children (Max was her eldest son, born in Berlin on the 21st of April 1864)—to social welfare work in which her religious and moral energy found a natural outlet. Her married life was not centred around sensual pleasure. When Helene was twenty-four she wrote to a friend: 'I am glad that you think as I do about the fascination of getting old.' Her eldest son was more deeply attached to her than to his father. Her unselfish moral example guided him throughout his life. When Helene Weber celebrated her seventieth birthday, her son wrote her a long and moving letter⁴ from Switzerland in which he expresses the great debt he owes to his mother. Referring to his own married life with Marianne, he says: 'What for twenty years has been ripening between Marianne and myself would never have grown, if I had not understood your life . . . difficult without, beautiful within. For I could have very easily become quite a different human being.' Max Weber was himself fifty when he wrote this letter and perhaps we may be justified to read between the lines, how difficult it was for him, passionate as he was, not to lose himself in externals and sensuality. The son's relationship to his father was rather cool and detached. He hated to see his mother treated as the chief servant of an always full house, and it was only after his father's death that he discovered his true measure. Thus we read in the same letter: 'We all do him justice now, when all difficult tensions are forgotten. We rejoice in what he was; we understand his uncommon, firm, and pure bourgeois sense, we know that the ruptures in his life were the tragedy of his whole generation which in its political and other ideals has never come into its own, which never saw its own hopes fulfilled, nor its aspirations continued by the younger generation. His generation had lost the old belief in authorities and yet it thought along authoritarian lines in things in which we had lost confidence.'⁵ In his father's

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house Max Weber's open young mind observed the declining trend of the National-Liberal Party to whose leaders his father belonged, though he was neither a good speaker, nor a brilliant political writer; but a solid indispensable party worker of the kind without which modern political parties cannot exist. Bennigsen, Miquel, Rickert, Julian Schmidt, Sybel, the author of the best German study on the French Revolution, Treitschke, Mommsen, the jurist Julius Goldschmidt, the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, all were regular guests and friends of Max Weber's family. What a unique chance for a young mind to learn! Nothing is more apt to shorten the arduous way to real scholarship than the opportunity of listening to the easy and casual conversation of great masters. Max Weber's unsurpassed erudition, which is so reminiscent of Leibniz' universality was fertilized in this circle.

The National-Liberal Party, to which, as we have already observed, Max Weber's father adhered, was the parliamentary party which supported Bismarck until 1878. But once the legal implications of the *Reichsgründung* of 1871 were completed, Bismarck destroyed the party, because he never could accept ministerial responsibility, uncompromising anti-parliamentarian royalist that he was. Within seven years the parliamentary representation of the National-Liberal Party declined from 152 in 1874, first to 98 in 1878, and then to 45 in 1881. National-Liberalism had served Bismarck well in supporting him in his struggle with political Catholicism (the Centre Party), but he soon made his peace with his former enemy, while protective tariffs and persecution of the Social Democratic Party won Bismarck the support of the Conservatives. Bismarck changed his political friends as he changed his shirts. In 1881 the Liberal Union (*Liberale Vereinigung*) split from the National-Liberals under the leadership of Rickert, because they refused to support Bismarck's protective tariff policy. Thus German Liberalism was split for a second time, as it had been previously split by the foundation of the Progress Party (*Fortschritts-Partei*) which after 1866 had declined to accept the indemnity laws to cover Bismarck's unconstitutional reign since 1862. The day, not only of German National-Liberalism, but of Liberalism altogether was done. German Liberalism never rose again, even if after the defeat of 1918 it appeared to have won new strength. But to this last chapter of German Liberalism we shall return later on.

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Bismarck and his policy must have been the ever recurring topic in Weber's father's house, Leibnizstrasse 19. The lessons from these discussions left a permanent mark on Max Weber's political mind. It is important to list them: (1) He had full opportunity to study the meaning and significance of German *Realpolitik*. Politics had become a technique for power pure and simple. One does not ask power for what purpose or how is the power of the State related to values perhaps embodied in the individual or in society, all this is sentiment or 'ideology'. 'Our foreign interests', writes Max Weber in an article published in *Die Hilfe* in 1916, the paper of his friend Friedrich Naumann, 'are essentially conditioned purely by our geographical situation. We are a power-State. (*Wir sind ein Machtstaat.*) For every power-State the proximity of another power-State means a restriction on the liberty of its own political decision, because it must show consideration for the other power-State. For each power-State it is desirable to be surrounded by possibly weak States or at least by as few other power-States as possible. Fate has ordained (*gefügt*) that only Germany borders three great land powers, and the three greatest after us, and moreover one of these is the greatest sea-power. Thus Germany is in their way. No other country on earth has to face such a situation.'⁶ The article from which this passage is taken has the title: *Germany and the European World-Powers*. It is meant as a re-interpretation of Bismarck's *Realpolitik* according to the changed circumstances of 1916. The *Machtstaat* idea is the *Leitmotiv* of Max Weber's political sociology and if only because it never changed throughout his life, we are fully entitled to introduce it at this stage. We shall meet it again and again on the following pages. Bismarck's example made Max Weber understand the lesson of Machiavelli's *Principe*.

(2) The second lesson which Max Weber may have learnt from Bismarck's example in those youthful years can perhaps be indicated by his term *charisma*: it is a gift of grace (*Gnadengabe*) for a people or a nation to have a great (charismatic) political leader. There can be no doubt that Bismarck was a great statesman; whether for the ultimate good of Germany is quite a different question, and anyway not a historical one. On the other hand, Max Weber clearly realized that Bismarck, by destroying German Liberalism, had left the German nation with a political vacuum. He created tools, could have no successors, and he left a nation devoid of political education. The fact that Weber met

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in his father's house some of the best political brains of his country taught him the political weakness of Bismarck's opponents.

(3) The third lesson Max Weber was taught was equally important, if not tragic, considering Weber's influence in 1918 when the so-called constitution of Weimar was being prepared. It was Bismarck who after 1866 first used universal franchise in Germany as a mechanism to integrate the masses of the German *Machtstaat*. Bismarck, for his part, was in this respect indebted to Napoleon III.⁷ We shall return to this point subsequently.

In school Max Weber does not do much work. The school curriculum only temporarily attracts him. He finds enough leisure during lessons to read, under the desk, through the forty-volume edition of Goethe's collected works. At home he reads Treitschke's works, Curtius' Greek History, and Victor Hehn's *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere*, a most fascinating cultural-historico-linguistical study, showing how plants and domestic animals have come from Asia to Greece and Italy and to other European countries. The universal outlook of his mind which in later years was to be demonstrated by his *Sociology of Religion*, his *General Economic History*, or his *Economics and Society* begins to take shape. When he was only seventeen, he wrote an essay, *Reflections on character and evolution of peoples amongst the Indo-Germanic nations*. In this premature attempt of a 'sociology' of culture, we see his mind at grips with the formidable task of formulating 'laws' of political history, covering the beginnings of history to the present. He is in those early years also endeavouring to understand Spinoza and Schopenhauer and in his last school year he is studying Kant. No wonder that his teachers, on his leaving school, testify to his outstanding knowledge, though admittedly not acquired by *Schulfleiß* (diligence in school). They also, characteristically enough for German school-teachers, express doubts as to the moral maturity of a youngster whose mind has broken through the narrow school walls.

Like his father, he decides to study jurisprudence as his main subject. As secondary subjects he chooses economics, history, and philosophy. Max Weber begins his university career in Heidelberg. He attends Knies' lectures on economics, which he finds 'dry'; with Kuno Fischer, Heidelberg's world-famous teacher, he studies philosophy; Professor Immanuel Bekker introduces him into the secrets of Roman Institutions and Roman History of Law. Bekker, he writes to his mother, is

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'never boring like Professor Knies'.⁸ The historian Erdmannsdoerffer provides him with a thorough training in historic documentation. Indeed Max Weber does not show much respect for academic dignity.

His uncle, Professor Adolf Hausrath, the Church historian, is married to his mother's sister. So Weber is not without family contacts in Heidelberg. But he prefers to spend his leisure time with fellow students, with whom he has a game of cards and a drink—or rather drinks. After some initial hesitation Max Weber joins the *Alemannen*, one of the many students' associations from which the offspring of a typical German *bourgeois* family would find it difficult to remain aloof. These students' associations (*Studentenverbindungen*) represent for the pre-1914 Germany an essential mechanism of social selection and integration of the leaders and sub-leaders of the professional classes (university teachers, judges, lawyers, doctors, industrial executives, and the higher strata of the Civil Service of State and communes). Their importance cannot be overestimated. They had a strict, though empty and purely formal, code of behaviour patterns which from Heine to Heinrich Mann have been a constant theme of justified attack and criticism by German progressive minds. External good manners or rather discipline, an enormous capacity for beer-drinking under complicated and strict rules, and last, but not least, duelling were the main 'educational' programme of the *Studentenverbindungen*. But their social cohesion was considerable. Fathers who had been members of these associations helped the sons of their friends to find socially adequate jobs, and their sons helped the sons of their friends. Together with the German officer corps no other social mechanism in Germany explains more clearly the rigid structure of the German ruling class. When Max Weber came home from his second university term, and his mother hardly recognized the scarred boozier as her son, she passionately slapped his face. It is good to have such a mother.

In company with his elder cousin, the theologian Otto Baumgarten, he reads Lotze's *Mikrokosmos* and plunges deeply into theological studies, reading D. F. Strauss, Schleiermacher, and Pfleiderer's work on Paulinism. Lotze appears to him to be a confused mass of rubbish, as compared with the wholesome clarity of Fr. A. Lange's *History of Materialism*.

At the beginning of his fourth term we find Weber in Strassburg. Here he serves, besides continuing his academic studies, his year as a

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soldier—it was the privilege of those who had passed their one-year volunteer examination to serve only one year in the German Army. In Strassburg he also came under the influence of the historian Professor Hermann Baumgarten who had married another of his mother's sisters. The influence of the Baumgarten family was decisive in Max Weber's life. Through Frau Ida Baumgarten and her daughter Emily he perhaps began fully to understand the character of his own mother. For Emily Max Weber developed a deep sympathy and love. This fragile, profound, never robust girl tamed his volcanic passions. Fragile women seem to exert a particularly deep influence on sensitive men who struggle to discipline their physical energies. When—ten years later—Max Weber became engaged to Marianne he wrote to Emmy, the friend of his youth: 'I have always—as you know—compared women and girls whom I met with the essence of your being, and it was a kind fate for my rude nature, that I felt myself morally forced to see the other sex through your eyes.'⁹ The two young people never confessed their love to each other:

Sieh dir die Liebenden an:
Wenn erst das Bekennen begann
Wie bald sie luegen.¹⁰

Indeed, Max Weber and Emmy Baumgarten have fulfilled the measure of Rilke's norm which is so difficult to realize. In the quiet fire of this noble relationship, Max Weber's moral personality perfected itself.

Through Ida Baumgarten he becomes familiar with the writings of the Unitarian New England theologian Channing who preached in the east of the United States during the first decades of the nineteenth century. These writings move him profoundly: 'As long as I can remember,' Weber writes to his mother in July 1884, 'religious problems have interested me, but now otherwise than merely objectively.'¹¹ This sentence is revealing enough. Weber is not easily communicative about his inner self. Channing must have struck a sympathetic chord in Weber's soul.

Yet one point in particular in Channing's religious philosophy rouses Weber's violent contradiction. We mean Channing's doctrine of the relation between religion and State. Channing taught that the final aim of all human institutions is the development and protection

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of the human being, made in the likeness of God. The human spirit is larger and more holy than the State and must never be allowed to be sacrificed to it. Civic and political freedom serve spiritual freedom. No tension arises, according to Channing, between Christian individual ethics and the ethics of the State. The life of communities is determined by the same ethical law as the life of individuals. State-power *per se* has no right to exist. Weber's objections are important. He writes again to his mother in December 1885: 'Such theories are not without danger, because they easily create a gap between the ostensible postulates of Christianity and those consequences and presuppositions which the civic order of the States demand and always has demanded. The whole misery of the Middle Ages is founded on this gap between a pretended godly and human order.'¹² Weber flatly refuses here to apply the Christian laws to the sphere of the State. Not that he was irreligious himself; on the contrary a profound *personal* religiosity was the innermost secret of his existence. When he was only fifteen, he wrote to Fritz Baumgarten who had asked him about his impressions with regard to his confirmation lessons: 'Indeed I believe that a human being who could sincerely say that he had no belief whatsoever, no hope for another life, such a being must feel very unhappy. For to begin life's pilgrimage with the belief that each step brings us only nearer to an utter dissolution, a dissolution which ends our existence for ever, that indeed must be a terrible feeling and remove all hope from one's life.'¹³ This confession does not contradict Weber's arguments against Channing. As a person you may be a saint in the sphere of State conflict; indeed tragedy prevails. Here you cannot escape from guilt. Not ONE God rules our modern world, but many. Not Christian sentiment (*Gesinnung*) creates fate in State and Society, but personal responsibility alone decides how far human beings become guilty. But guilty they must become. *Realpolitik* and German Protestantism go together as Bismarck's example has already taught us. Though it is only in Weber's last lecture to German students *Politics as a Calling* that these thoughts find their final shape, they ripen as early as during this Alsatian period.

It is not easy to serve in the German Army and to be a student at the same time. He writes ironically of the 'perfidies of the beautiful military life'¹⁴ and complains that his faculty to think is steadily diminishing: 'one becomes curiously idiotic through this permanent drill and

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service and what is worst, one realizes it'.¹⁵ These and similar complaints are now an ever recurrent theme in his letters; Weber particularly hates this 'colossal loss of time which stands in no relation to what the individual learns or what regiment or State profits'.¹⁶ He attempts to read Wilhelm Dilthey's *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften*, but after the first seventy pages he gives it up because he cannot remember what he has read. 'I admit, once I have reached the darkest depths of stupidity—being completely unable to find even by use of a microscope any sign of brains in my head, I handle my rifle best and I shoot well. . . .'¹⁷ And yet he manages to visit regularly uncle Baumgarten's History seminar and criticizes, trained in Ranke's method, French, Spanish, and Italian historians of the Reformation period.

However much Weber may complain about the stupidity of military drill, his mind clearly is steadily ripening. His letters of this Strassburg period show concise thought and a growing power to judge persons, their circumstances and situations. A predominantly legal training has formed the style and mould of his thought. Great lawyers combine the power of abstraction with the faculty to see the essentials of concrete situations. The structure of Weber's style is very similar to that of Maitland whose *Constitutional History of England* in coming years he thoroughly absorbed.

In September 1884 Weber is an *Unteroffizier* (N.C.O.) with the qualification of becoming a reserve officer. Military service and *Burschenschaft* have been expensive. His letters to his father are full of sometimes very embarrassing and unpleasant financial accounts. His monthly allowance seems always to have been too little and *nolens volens* father Weber had to pay. Perhaps it was cheaper to have *Unteroffizier cand. jur.* Max Weber in his father's house in Berlin. Thus we find him at the beginning of his sixth term in the German metropolis.

In Berlin he hears lectures on German Private Law by Beseler, and he thoroughly enjoys and admires Gneist's lectures on German State Law and Prussian Administrative Law. Treitschke appears to him as a propagandist and an agitator. Gneist's influence on Weber is of paramount importance. From him he undoubtedly learnt to understand the exemplary significance of British political institutions. What Montesquieu and de Lolme have performed for the eighteenth century—teaching the lessons, or in Sorel's sense, rather the myth of British

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constitutional government—so Gneist wrote and taught the history of British State Law for nineteenth-century Germany.¹⁸ The deeper we penetrate into Weber's political sociology the more we shall understand how the great example of British statemanship permeated his thought. He also attends the lectures of Brunner and Gierke, the two masters of German legal history.

In 1886 he stayed for another term in Goettingen, but returned in 1887 to Berlin. In the meantime he has completed his first military manœuvres and is now a reserve officer with the 47th Infantry Regiment in Strassburg. He prefers to command rather than to obey. Weber is now also *Referendar* and is dealing with criminal cases at the *Landesgericht II* in Berlin. Again he complains that his director tolerates only with great pessimism legal interference with the cases of which Weber is in charge, again he finds the *exteriora* of nicely written protocols tiresome, if not boring. Weber's handwriting is anyway hardly readable. He finds time to study with Mommsen Roman State Law, and discovers at last in Professor Goldschmidt a congenial teacher under whom he prepares his Ph.D. thesis which is dedicated to a History of Commercial Societies in the Middle Ages (*Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter*). This was a study in a field where legal and economic history meet and coincide, revealing a complete mastery of jurisprudence and ease in handling historic documentation from many sources. When Max Weber had to defend his thesis in Latin before a distinguished academic audience his old teacher Mommsen raised some objections. After Weber had replied, Mommsen said, though he remained unconvinced: 'When I come to die, there is no one better to whom I should like to say this: Son, the spear is too heavy for my hand, carry it on, highly respected Max Weber.'¹⁹ Thus Weber was launched as a scholar. It is useful and honourable to have a Mommsen's blessing at the beginning of an academic career.

Weber is not certain whether he should devote himself fully to an academic career. For another half decade he lives in his father's house and he suffers intensely from his financial dependence. The conflict whether he should turn to practical things or whether he should pursue the aim of achieving something outstanding in the field of scholarship and academic teaching—and only an outstanding achievement would satisfy him—is profound. This conflict is, as it were, of constitutional significance for Max Weber's whole being. His uncle Hermann Baum-

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garten to whom he reports regularly about the great events of the world as they focus themselves in the German metropolis urges him to prepare himself for an academic career. 'Temporarily', the young man replies, 'purely scientific work has lost all its excitement, because I live under the impression that practical interests, the regulation of which is the elementary task of Law, offer combinations which are not to be grasped by means of our science, so that legal study for science's sake has lost interest.'²⁰ Still, he works on studies of Roman agrarian history to qualify for his *venia legendi* on Roman and German Commercial Law. He publishes these studies as a book in 1891 under the title: *Die roemische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutung für das Staats- und Privatrecht*. Out of this book he is later on to form a contribution for the *Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (3rd edition, 1909).

Before he begins his lectures, Weber makes another attempt to break the chains of an academic career. He makes an application to become a city-lawyer in Bremen, but he fails. 'I have an extraordinary longing', he writes again to his uncle Baumgarten, 'to have a practical job, and the job in Bremen would perhaps have satisfied me. I admit that it takes some effort—though the idea of becoming a scholar is congenial to me—to wait until the unpaid *Referendar* and *Assessor* become the likewise unpaid lecturer (*Privatdozent*). I believe that a financially independent position might have given me perhaps less exterior peace for scholarly work, yet I would have had more inner peace.'²¹ Max Weber was not a typical German bookworm. Theoretical work had only then a meaning to him when it tended to become practical in application. The conflict which we have seen at work here, determined also his relation to politics. Here too he was constantly torn between political analysis and political action.

While Weber is studying the agrarian history of Rome, he joins the Association for Social Policy (*Verein für Sozialpolitik*) which in 1873 had been founded by the German economists Adolf Wagner, Schmoller, Brentano, Knapp, and others, though lawyers also like Gneist and others supported the aims of the association. Weber undertakes for the association to survey 'the position of the land workers in East-Elbian Germany' (*Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deutschland*).²² Together with his colleagues of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, to which he belonged throughout his life, he now is able to formulate the political

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beliefs of his own generation much more clearly. The old German Emperor, Wilhelm I, died in 1888. Weber's uncle Hermann Baumgarten with whom, as we have seen, he is in intimate communication, believed at first that Bismarck might return to his policy of the years 1867-77, based on collaboration with the National-Liberals. Yet Weber rejects this possibility and realizes that the rupture inside German Liberalism is deeper and perhaps even final (between fanatical demagogues on the one side and Bismarckian National-Liberals on the other). Weber was right in his prognosis. Still he has confidence in his own generation. 'I had many opportunities to study the ideas and beliefs of my generation, or of those who are a few years older than ourselves. To be sure, there are amongst them many *blasé* fellows who are anti-Semites because they don't know better; many idealists who have become through Treitschke mystical, nationalistic fanatics, others who have accepted the ostensible, gentlemanlike boasting and the so-called realism in fashion. These people whose political interest is of a very recent date . . . are very numerous indeed, and they make the greatest noise. But there are other elements amongst them, and I have come to the conclusion that they are the only ones who are conscious of themselves, energetic and consequently decisive for the future—who have got rid of anti-Semitism and all other related excrescences. They stand on essentially different ground from the National-Liberalism of the seventies, and I am not in the position to deny them freedom of mind. They also see the period from 1867 to 1877 in a quite different light. . . . They are for the greater part economists and social politicians (*Sozialpolitiker*) and it is, therefore, not astonishing that to them the interference of the State with social problems is even more essential than to others. . . . It is an indisputable fact that the Liberalism of the seventies regarded the social tasks of the State as less important than may be justified or than we regard as normal now. Even to-day Liberals regard social legislation with a perhaps justifiable, but almost passive distrust, instead of co-operating. . . . These politicians regard the National-Liberal era only as a transition period to one of greater tasks for the State and they also underrate the legislative work of those years with regard to constitutional and administrative problems, as far as these are not purely technical or socio-politically interesting . . . Here are objective differences, differences in valuations . . . but an understanding in many things is easily reached.'²³ It is clear from these sen-

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tences that Weber has his own reservations with regard to the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*. He criticizes the bureaucratic tendency of the association, but is confident that this tendency will correct itself. Yet for the time being the Caesarian régime of Bismarck must have its effects.

The *Association* finally accepts the fact of contemporary German industrialization, but its hectic tempo has disastrous effects on the balance of Germany's body politic. While the *Association* does not intend to attack the basic property relations of German society, it pleads for factory laws, control of banking and commerce, and the general betterment of the working classes. The members of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* were attacked as 'Academic Socialists' (*Kathedersozialisten*). Its members were, apart from academic people, merchants, industrialists, and civil servants, in short, a kind of German PEP.

What made Weber join the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*? Certainly first and foremost the 'objective' interests of the Association. The German political parties were in process of reorientation and reformation, after Bismarck had relinquished the leadership of the *Reich*. Moreover, the 'social question' stood in the foreground, not only because of the tempo of the process of German industrialization, but also because the law against the socialist movement had been revoked (1890). This law, introduced by Bismarck in 1878, had destroyed the whole of the official organizations of the Social-Democratic Party (332 Social-Democratic newspapers had been suppressed, 900 persons expelled from Germany, and 1,500 put in prison or condemned to hard labour); yet the election in 1890 brought 35 Social-Democratic members into the German *Reichstag*. One million voters out of an electorate of 7,656,000 voted for the previously outlawed party. The National-Liberals, Max Weber's father's party, secured only 42 seats during the same elections. The German *bourgeoisie* was alarmed, now indeed the 'harmony of the classes' of which the law against socialism spoke in 1878, seemed seriously endangered. Of course, it never was. Apart from providing the Social-Democratic party with a thorough education in enmity against a State which had outlawed the conscious elements of its working class, an enmity which the Social-Democratic party in its subsequent history, as we shall have opportunity to see later on, never fully overcame, the pre-1918 *Reichstag* being only a sham parliament, confronted by a government with no ministerial responsibility whatsoever, could ultimately only vote for its own dissolution. Yet as an

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instrument to measure German public opinion, the *Reichstag* was useful, if not important.

Max Weber was not easily frightened, but perhaps it is arguable that his strong and, as it were, *a priori* determination never to question the German State as such is due to this sudden appearance of the Social Democrats on the political horizon. In the exposition of his findings on the 'Agrarian Constitution'²⁴ at the meeting of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, he says: 'Let us turn now to the proletariat: the time is still far off, when we shall be able to join hands with the urban proletariat for a solution of social problems. I hope that this will come, but for the time being, there can be no question of it.' Weber had met many German workers during his military service. He liked their honesty, decency, and modesty. He knew what he was talking about. In the same report where he should have been examining the conditions of the land workers, he makes it quite clear that the guiding idea of his survey was 'the point of view of *raison d'état*; this is to me not a question of the land workers; I am not asking do they live well or badly, or how can we help them.'²⁵ No. Weber was already thoroughly at home in the realm of German *Realpolitik*. 'The interest of the State with regard to the problem of agrarian workers in the east is concerned only with their attitude towards the foundations of social organizations; can the State permanently rely on them for the solution of those political problems with which in the near future it may be faced?' Weber proposes the complete stoppage of the influx of Polish and Russian land workers into Germany's eastern provinces. Only then can German culture in the east, the defence of Germany's eastern frontier, be guaranteed.²⁶ Culturally and economically, Weber assumes, the superiority of Germany must be maintained. 'With our Polish friends (his term is *Volksgenosse*!) we shall be able to deal, we hope to raise the Polish proletariat of the inland to the level of the German culture—but this becomes impossible if by continued invasions of swarms of nomads from the east this cultural work is regularly destroyed and reversed.'²⁷ Here, it seems, we meet another of Max Weber's political *a priori* convictions: an unquestioning hatred and fear of the Russian colossus. It is surprising that one of the most rational minds human history has produced was never able to analyse his own political prejudices objectively. We shall meet Weber's Russophobia again and again as our interpretation proceeds.

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This inability to see through his own prejudices, as his acceptance of the power-State idea and his Russophobia prove, is all the more surprising, if one considers Weber's longing for objectivity. He despised, yes indeed he hated the interference of one's own valuations (see the above-quoted extract from his letter to Hermann Baumgarten) when scientific objectivity alone was demanded. We shall have an opportunity to see how, in later years, he is to devote much time to clarifying the significance of the postulate to write and teach 'without valuations in the economic and sociological sciences'.²⁸ This postulate which his own political sociology hardly fulfilled probably has its roots in the overwhelming strength of his own passions. Just because he attempted to rationalize his own instincts, drives, feelings, and sentiments, he demanded that others should do the same. That our own laws are not the laws of others is a conviction which is often expressed in his *Jugendbriefe*; consequently we are not allowed to measure others with our own yardstick. A kind of ethical pantheism reveals itself here, nourished perhaps by his study of Spinoza's philosophy. But while Spinoza taught that passions must ultimately be mastered by reason,²⁹ Weber distinctly transforms the classical seventeenth-century rationalism by separating the sphere of ethics from the sphere of reason.

In a letter of twelve printed pages to Emmy Baumgarten of the 5th of July 1887³⁰ he attempts to explain this separation: 'The idea of the Good and the contemplation of the Beautiful rest on laws which are basic for human nature—this they have in common—but these laws are essentially of a different kind and character, nearly as different as the law of the State that the murderer must be punished by death and the law of nature that all bodies attract each other. . . .'³¹ With regard to the moral conscience Weber says in the same letter: 'Here we reach the frontiers of the human reason (*Begriffsvermogen*), and we enter a totally new world, where a quite different part of our mind pronounces judgement about things, and everyone knows that its judgements, though not based on reason, are as certain and clear as any logical conclusion at which reason may arrive. . . .' It appears that Weber is steeped in Plato's philosophy, but like Plato he fails to explain how the idea of the Good as distinct from the idea of the True can be applied to a world which has moral *and* rational structures at the same time. If our moral laws are fundamentally enigmatic, enigmatic from the point of view of reason, the moral universe becomes anarchic. Not ONE

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God, but many determine the world, and it is impossible to judge who believes in the right God. If we interpret Weber's philosophical presuppositions rightly, it is evident that *Realpolitik* and moral individualism may logically be compatible. Yet both phenomena have been falsified. Politics and morals cannot fundamentally be separated.

Weber began his academic lectures in the spring of 1892. After his second term his teacher Professor Goldschmidt, then seriously ill, entrusted the young lecturer with his own classes. In 1893 Weber was appointed Professor extraordinary. The Prussian minister of education wanted him to be attached to Berlin University.

In these years Weber observed with apprehension the appearance of Wilhelm II on the German political scene. 'If only the young Emperor', we read in a letter to Hermann Baumgarten of December 1889, 'would show consistency! These manifestations so reminiscent of Boulanger and Bonaparte are indeed undesirable. . . .'³² By 1892 Weber has become much more outspoken with regard to the Kaiser. Again he expresses his anxieties to his paternal friends 'But how can one attempt to talk about our situation and perspectives? Both depend on an incalculable factor: *the personality of the Kaiser*. . . . He obviously is dealing with politics from the point of view of a young lieutenant. Nobody can deny that generally he fulfils his duty in the sense of "service". But his stubbornness and his disastrous (*unheimlich*) sense of power causes such an unheard-of disorganization within the higher ranks of the administration that repercussions on the administration as a whole cannot be excluded. Thus he has degraded the humanly very respectable Caprivi³³ to a caricature and there can hardly be any question of the authority of the *Reich's* Government. . . .'³⁴ Max Weber's political judgement was already mature, the noise and deceiving glitter of the new imperial régime never blinded him.

In 1892 Max Weber found in Marianne Weber—her grandfather was the elder brother of Max Weber's father—the friend and companion of his life. Marianne was twenty-one when she came as a guest to Weber's father's house. By Max Weber's side the young girl plunges into the life of the Berlin of 1892. He says good-bye to Emmy Baumgarten, the love of his youth, and opens his soul to Marianne. 'I am a curiously reflective bridgeroom,' he writes to Emmy, 'in some respects older than my years.'³⁵ And to Marianne he writes: 'We must

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not tolerate within us vague and mystical attitudes. If feelings run high, you must tame them, to steer your life soberly.'³⁶ Frau Marianne Weber has testified to the intimate understanding of her husband by editing his works and letters, and by writing his *Lebensbild* to which this study is greatly indebted.

Max Weber was at long last certain of his future. 'I go the road which I must go and which you now know.'³⁷

III

From Economics to Sociology

In 1894 Weber accepted a professorship of economics at the university of Freiburg-im-Breisgau. Perhaps he felt that Baden, with its old liberal traditions, was a more congenial atmosphere for a man who held dangerous views about the ruling monarch. Two of Weber's colleagues were outstanding logicians: the physiologist Kries and the philosopher Heinrich Rickert whose father we have already met amongst the guests in Max Weber senior's house in Berlin. Rickert's study *Ueber die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* has exerted a considerable influence on Weber in clarifying his methodological approach towards the problems of the social sciences. It was Rickert—he was following Wilhelm Windelband¹—who stressed that nature and history have to be analysed by two essentially different methods: the scientific method attempts to formulate general laws, while the aim of the historical sciences (the term Rickert uses here is the untranslatable term *Kulturwissenschaften*) is to interpret individual objects. Now individuality can only be explained by relating it to values. Historical thought must, consequently, be based on a general system of values, if the science of history is to claim general validity. Yet the value system of Rickert's philosophy was of such a generalized character that it left the historic process without any content. The ostensible logic of this philosophy was deceptive inasmuch as it failed to explain the fundamental structure of historic situations.²

We have not attempted to go into the very intricate problems which Rickert developed, it only seemed necessary to give some idea of the mental climate to which Weber's own thought—in negation or affirmation—had to adapt itself. It appears to be a peculiar feature of German thought—since Kant—to reflect more on method than e.g. English thought. This fact is difficult to explain. One of the reasons

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perhaps is that the German socio-political framework, in which the philosopher found himself, was provincial and unbalanced to such an extent that he felt the urge to create a spiritual world of his own. Such an attitude, if our interpretation is right, would to some extent explain the formidable German philosophic systems which have been constructed from Kant to Nietzsche. The growth of science, urbanization, and industrialization during the second half of the nineteenth century, and particularly since the beginning of the last third—Weber's philosophy, if one can call it such, being a typical illustration—confronted German thought with problems of a greater complexity. Consequently the faculty of building philosophic systems gradually diminished, but the intensity of methodological reflection grew. Again a world, ostensibly firm and solid, could be built, as it were, *ex nihilo*.

With these introductory remarks we may be sufficiently equipped for an analysis of Max Weber's inaugural lecture which he gave in 1894 on *The National State and Germanic Policy*.³ He takes his starting point from the result of his survey of agrarian conditions in East Prussia. 'Economic culture, a relatively high standard of living and German nationality (*Deutschtum*) coincide in East Prussia.'⁴ Now further statistical analysis shows that German land workers are leaving the districts with a high culture, whereas Polish peasants in districts of a lower level increase. Thus the Slav race being materially and economically less exacting displaces the German population. 'Why do the German land workers leave?'⁵ asked Weber. Not for materialistic reasons. These people want to free themselves from the yoke of the *Junker*, the Prussian estate-owner. 'In this gloomy, half-conscious drive towards more distant lands a primitive idealism is hidden. Those who cannot understand this situation do not know the lure of freedom.'⁶ The Prussian landworkers envy their urban comrades who are able to unite, while the Prussian *Junkers*, in their economic death struggle, still treat them as serfs.

Max Weber does not hesitate in drawing the logical conclusions from his arguments. The German frontier has to be closed against the threatening dangers from the east. He demands the parcelling up of those big *Junker* estates which are uneconomic. Only a numerous and healthy German peasantry can protect Germany's eastern frontiers in peace and in war. 'Yet . . . I do not want to discuss the practical question of Prussian agrarian policy. I only wanted to refer to the fact that

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such a problem, the protection of the German nationality, arises, and that its protection is a task with which the economic policy of the State has to cope. The fact that our State is a *National State* (Weber's own italics) entitles us to make such a demand.'⁷ He proceeds now to inquire whether such 'nationalistic' (*nationalistische*) prejudices are legitimate for an economic policy of a scientific character. His answer is important for an understanding of his political sociology. 'Also in an apparently peaceful situation . . . the economic struggle between nationalities continues. Not in an open struggle have the German peasants and the German land workers to leave their soil—forced to do so by a politically superior enemy. . . .'⁸ Struggle, teaches Max Weber with Heraclitus, is the father of all things: 'We know', he says bluntly and unmistakably, 'economic policy (*Volkswirtschaftspolitik*) is according to a vulgar conception an inquiry into recipes for the happiness of the world—for a happiness-enumeration principle⁹ amongst human beings. . . . Yet already the stern seriousness of the population problem prevents us from being eudaimonists, deluding ourselves that peace and happiness are hidden in the lap of the future; on the contrary only in a hard struggle between man and man can elbowroom be won in our earthly existence'.¹⁰ We see how Weber applies here his basic conception of the power-State in the sphere of economics or rather of economic policy. 'Economics, as an explanatory and analytical science, is *international*, but as soon as economics expresses values, it becomes bound up with the substance of our life as a nation.'¹¹ If Weber were right, there would be little hope for the future.¹² All international economic co-operation would be *a priori* futile and impossible. We refrain from any discussion of this Hobbesian economics, but to anyone who cares to glance at Lord Keynes' recently published suggestions for a post-war currency plan, Weber's thesis must appear as absurd. Yet he writes in all seriousness: 'The economic policy of a German State, as likewise the value-standard of a German economic theorist, can therefore only be German.'¹² Consequently, economic policy is a *political science*. As such it is a servant of politics, not, of course, in the interests of those who just happen to be in power, either as individuals or classes, 'but in the permanent, power-political interests of the nation . . . ; in this respect the ultimate value standard also for economic inquiry is for us the *raison d'état* (*Staatsräson*). . . .'¹³

Weber then shows that economic power and the calling of political

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leadership of a nation are not always identical in the course of the historic process. On the other hand it seems to him that economic power has always given rise to the prospect of political leadership. In this context Weber makes some interesting remarks about England: 'With nations like the English to whom the dependence of their economic success on their political power situation is not daily demonstrated, the instincts for these specific political interests are not present, at least not generally, within the great masses of the nation which have to struggle for the necessities of daily life—it would be unjust to ask for these instincts here. Yet in great moments, in case of war, the significance of national power strikes their soul—then, they realize that the national state rests on genuine (*urwuechsigen*) psychological foundations, also with the economically dominated large groups of the nation. Furthermore that the nation is not only the superstructure (*Ueberbau*), simply the organization of the economically dominating groups. In normal times this political instinct of the masses becomes unconscious. Then it is the specific function of the economically and politically leading groups to be bearers of the political sense (*Sinnes*), the sole reason to justify them politically.'

These remarks are important in two respects. Firstly they refute the substance of the Marxian theory of history by making it clear that politics or rather political leadership is not 'simply' the 'expression' of prevailing class structures within a given society. On the other hand Weber has studied Marx and we shall see, as this essay proceeds, that he is continuing to study him. The second point worth noting is that Weber begins to see in the British State structure his norm-giving ideal. Again the following pages will bear out our interpretation, but it is essential for an understanding of Weber's political sociology to observe his mind, as it were, *in statu nascendi*. Weber had never studied British political institutions on the spot; that is to say, he never lived in England, though a few months after he had given the inaugural lecture with the analysis of which we are now concerned, he travelled to England, Scotland, and Ireland with his wife. Certainly Weber was a sensitive traveller and his mind had a remarkable power of observation—his letters from the British Isles to his mother illustrate this¹⁶—, but countries with old traditions like England and France can only be understood if one shares the common life of their peoples. Only then will you see more than 'conventions', you begin to ask and

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to understand, how these strange manners come about. Perhaps after years, if you are lucky and have patience, you will penetrate behind the façade and suddenly you may discover the secret norms which guide the Englishmen.

Then you no longer ridicule their table manners or their food, you begin to appreciate their apparent aloofness and shyness, you grasp their deep sensitivity and loneliness—and only morally strong people can stand being alone—you discover that one of your friends who is one of England's greatest administrators is also an outstanding bird expert, because in watching birds he finds unity with nature which the necessities of modern administration threaten to break up, you humbly admire your aristocratic friend—one of those families who are as old as the monarchy if not older—who spends his time in helping to redress injustice, or you are moved by the fairness of your labouring friend who asks for a vote of thanks because he thinks you have shown some 'objectivity' in addressing a meeting on German problems amidst a second world war. Tolerance, fairness, love of freedom, not the *raison d'état* of the power-State are the unconscious traditions of the English which, unfortunately, cannot be transplanted into other soil.

The atmospheric character of these British traditions never became familiar to Max Weber. He had to rely on books, but even if there are some which are permeated with this spirit, are their letters not dead if you have not experienced the living example of English institutions?

We return now to Weber's inaugural address. He asks which are the social classes apt and ready to rule Germany politically? 'It is dangerous and in the long run incompatible with the interest of the nation if an economically declining class holds political power, but it is even more dangerous if classes, towards which economic power and henceforth aspiration to political power is moving, are politically not yet mature for political leadership.'¹⁵ The *Junkers* are the declining class, the German *bourgeoisie* and the workers are the aspirants for the new political leadership. 'The estates of the east were the protective points of the dominating class disseminated all over Prussia, they formed the *point d'appui* of the civil service, yet irresistibly with the social decline of the *Junkers*, the gravitation point of the political intelligentsia moves to the towns.'¹⁶ But is the German *bourgeoisie* politically mature enough to take on the political leadership of the nation? Weber answers in the negative. Not yet. Whether it will ever be politically

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mature is the main problem of our study. It is due to Bismarck's influence that the slowly developing faculty of political judgement of the German *bourgeoisie* appears to be burnt out.

Is this final? 'The reason for the political immaturity of broad masses of the German *bourgeoisie* is to be found in its political past. The political education of a century (has Weber here again the political example of England before his eyes?) cannot be made good within one decade, and the domination of a great man (Bismarck) is not always a means of political education. The serious question now for the political future of the German *bourgeoisie* is: Is it too late to make good this lack of political education? No economic factor can replace it.'¹⁷ Weber turns now to the German working class. Are the German workers ready for the political leadership of Germany? Economically, they seem to him more mature than the *bourgeoisie* is ready to admit; they are also fully entitled to fight openly for the economic representation of their interests. But does all this make them politically mature? Are they the spiritual heirs of the French Convention? No. 'They are infinitely more harmless than they appear to be, there is no spark of a Catilinarian energy of action in them, and also no sign of that formidable *national* passion which was prevalent in the Convention.'¹⁸ The German situation is serious, maintains Weber almost twenty years before the outbreak of the first world war. The *bourgeois* classes seem to decline and the working class is not yet ready to take their place. 'An immense task of political education lies before us, and there is no more serious duty for every one of us, for each in his narrow circle, than to collaborate in the political education of our nation which must remain the ultimate aim of our science.'¹⁹ This indeed from now on is Weber's programme and task. We have thus given a preliminary outline of his political sociology.

Weber's political ideas made a particularly strong impression on Friedrich Naumann, who was four years older than Weber, the leader of the *Evangelisch-Soziale Verein*, and his younger friends. Weber had already met Naumann before 1894 at one of the first meetings of this political group. Naumann accepts Weber's idea of the socially responsible *Machtstaat*. Thus he writes in July 1895 in *Die Hilfe*: 'Is he (Weber) not right? Of what use is the best social policy if the Cossacks are coming? Whoever wants to concern himself with internal policy must first secure people, fatherland, and frontiers, he must consolidate

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national power. Here is the weakest point of the Social-Democratic party; we need a socialism which is *administrable*, capable of making a better policy than hitherto. Such a socialism still does not exist. Such a socialism must be national.' This is clearly spirit of Weber's spirit. In spite of Weber's warning Naumann attempted to transform the *Evangelische-Soziale Verein* into a political party with its own newspaper. Weber saw quite clearly that this well-meaning group of theologians, university professors, craftsmen, and even of a few workers had no unifying point of economic gravitation. Moreover, the intellectual leaders showed an enormous lack of 'political instinct'. Yet Weber is ready to help, and Naumann's first candidature for the *Reichstag* is financed by Weber's mother and her sister Frau Ida Baumgarten. (In the meantime both had become widows.) The daily paper had to be discontinued—from lack of funds. And Naumann's candidature was a failure too. The *Verein* fell between two stools. It failed to draw members of the Social-Democratic party, and the *bourgeoisie*, on the other hand, was not easily convinced that a national and social policy was a sound proposition. Later on Naumann's group joined the political left wing of the *bourgeoisie*, the *Freisinnige Vereinigung* and formed with it the *Libérale Wahlverein*. After 1918 Naumann became one of the leaders of the democratic party.

It was within this group that Max Weber had his first experience of practical politics. Perhaps he began then to realize the intrinsic complexities of political machines within the modern mass state. Political failures are sometimes more important lessons for the political theorist than political successes.

Weber is far from satisfied with being a successful scholar and academic teacher. His political passions give him no rest. Thus we read in a letter to Lujo Brentano: 'If I have achieved personally unsought and undemanded "successes" in my academic career, I must say that these successes leave me rather cold, because they do not answer my question whether I am in my right place in this career.'²⁰ A Liberal political association in Saarbruecken where he had recently made a speech, asked Weber whether he would be prepared to accept a candidature for the German *Reichstag*. He declined, having just been appointed professor of economics at Heidelberg University.

Frau Marianne Weber has given us an excellent (though perhaps somewhat uncritical) summary of Weber's attitude during those years

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towards the German political parties: 'The Naumann group does not—for the time being—represent a serious public platform. With the left wing of the Liberals, Weber shares the democratic ideals, but they show a lack of a great national impulse. . . . With the National-Liberals he again shares their individualistic attitude, he affirms with them that industrial capitalism is an indispensable power for the national economy. Yet their lack of a democratic and social-political attitude separates him from them. With the Conservatives and the *All-deutsche* he shares their national impulse, but they support the economic policy of the agrarians of the east at the cost of the other classes.'²¹ The art of political compromise was not given to Max Weber.

Weber is now the successor of his former teacher and a colleague of Immanuel Bekker who first introduced him to Roman Law of which he is now a master.²² The historian Erdmannsdoerffer, the philosopher Kuno Fischer still teach at Heidelberg. Weber soon finds new friends in his colleagues Georg Jellinek, the author of Germany's most widely read text-book on *Staatslehre*, Ernst Troeltsch, the theologian and philosopher who, mainly owing to Weber's influence, turns towards sociology, of which his great work on the *Social Teachings of the Christian Churches* is the admirable result. With Troeltsch the Webers later on share uncle Hausrath's house, and it needs little imagination to see both men in fruitful intellectual intercourse during those happy years when they were living together under the same roof. Indeed, it would be difficult to say whether Weber's sociology of religion is more influenced by Troeltsch's studies in this field or *vice versa*. The profound and sensitive moral philosopher Paul Hensel, and the art historian Karl Neumann who was a pupil of Jacob Burckhardt, are also among Weber's friends. Burckhardt's *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, which are now, at long last, translated into English, and his lectures on Greek culture, become familiar books to Weber, confirming him in his universal outlook.

Yet the full life in Heidelberg came soon and unexpectedly to an end. Weber suffered a complete breakdown. He was forced to give up his lectures, he was even unable to hold his seminars, he was unable to read, he even had to give up the stimulating discussions with his friends. Max Weber was a broken man. We do not know much about this mysterious illness. Was it nervous exhaustion, was it overwork, was it the revenge of a childhood spent among books instead of enjoying

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walks and boyish games in the open air, or were there conditions of a more physical character for such an illness which seemed to bring a great career to an untimely end? We do not know and perhaps we should not ask.

Years pass before he fully recovers. Under Italy's sun Max Weber after a slow and painful process of recuperation finds his strength again. In Rome and Florence his great historical imagination is reawakening. Books begin again to be of interest: he is reading Aristophanes, Rousseau's *Émile*, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Taine's works, and he studies the history and economics of the monasteries. After three and a half years of illness his mind works again. The Webers return to Heidelberg. The old friends, Troeltsch, Jellinek, Hensel, and Neumann, come again for spirited discussions, but Weber is unable to resume his academic duties. His nervous constitution is not strong enough to guarantee regular work. Max Weber is now a *Honorarprofessor*.

And yet it seems when in 1903 Weber's new phase of production begins that his mind has grown. He is almost forty now. His style is more concise, his thought more condensed. Perhaps the mind grows and 'thinks' even if we think it is asleep.

Weber now begins the long series of studies to clarify the methods of the social sciences. The first of these essays deals with 'Roscher and Knies and the logical problems of the historical national economy' (*Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie*),²³ the second article appears in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*. Its title is: *Die 'Objektivität' sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis*.²⁴ Weber has joined the editorial committee of the *Archiv*, together with Werner Sombart and Edgar Jaffé. The *Archiv* was a continuation of the *Archiv für Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik* which its editor Heinrich Braun had sold to Edgar Jaffé. The *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* was until 1933, when the night of German scholarship began, Germany's leading periodical on social problems, a suitable platform for Max Weber's mature pen. Rickert's chief work *Ueber die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung* and Georg Simmel's *Philosophy of Money* had occupied his mind during his convalescence. Friedrich Gottl's *Die Herrschaft des Wortes. Untersuchungen zur Kritik des nationalökonomischen Denkens* (1901) also provided Weber with valuable sugges-

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tions. But Weber does not lose himself in purely methodological reflections—very much in contrast to many of those who have been working in the same field. His mind is directed towards the understanding of the concrete process of history. Furthermore, he wants to arrive at answers to questions like these: how has our present world situation come about, what is our position in the world process of history, what have we to do to save our souls in view of the inescapable threat of rationalization and bureaucratization inherent in modern industrialism?

This European, or more accurately perhaps, world theme becomes more and more distinct in Weber's sociology after 1904. He has lived outside provincial Germany for years, he has come in touch with the breath of the world. Spain, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland have widened his intellectual horizon. We must follow this new trend of his mind and life if we intend to grasp the widening scope of his political sociology.

During the summer of 1904 Weber accepts an invitation to attend a scientific World Congress in St. Louis—together with his Heidelberg colleagues Hensel and Troeltsch. He had been asked to give a lecture on 'The rural community' (*Deutsche Agrarverhältnisse in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*).²⁵ Yet what was more important, this trip to the United States gave him the opportunity of studying American social institutions on the spot. Like de Tocqueville,²⁶ so Weber saw in American life and culture the future shape towards which the occidental world is moving. In his letters to his mother he records his impressions: 'I cannot say that the skyscrapers (in New York) are ugly . . . they give a picture of the rock with the castle of a robber-knight on top of it; they are certainly not beautiful, but also not the contrary, they are a symbol of neither ugliness nor beauty, but a symbol of what is happening here. . . .'²⁷ Again, like de Tocqueville, he touches upon the fundamental problem of this modern American society which in 1904 (as in 1832) anticipated the coming structure of our Western societies: 'In this agglomeration of masses every impulse of individualism, be it with regard to housing or food, is expensive.'²⁸ Weber is overwhelmed by the intensity of the American mass production. In Chicago he observes, divided between horror and admiration, the chain belt system, as applied in the meat factories: 'The moment the unsuspecting bull enters the slaughter-house, the mechanical hammer

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kills it instantly, an iron clasp carries it away, from worker to worker, who disembowel and skin it, and who themselves are tied always to the machine—to the tempo of the chain-belt.' This and similar impressions illustrate for Weber the new realism of the twentieth century.

Again, like de Tocqueville, he searches for the effects of the new technical or completely rationalized age on the historic American traditions. He visits American colleges of which many have been founded by Puritan sects. He describes a religious service in Haverford, near Philadelphia. Surely the impact of modern life on these religious communities is visible, 'but their power is still immense as compared with our Protestantism'.²⁹ In St. Louis he is impressed by the hospitality of a German-American home. His host was an immigrant from Westphalia where he was a poor peasant boy. Now he is a wealthy man, and testifies to the quality of a democracy 'without diploma and family background'.³⁰

From St. Louis Max Weber visits the Southern states. In the state of Oklahoma, until recently a reservation for the Red Indians, he again sees the unavoidable 'victory' of the fully developed capitalistic age: 'The time of the virgin forest is ended. . .'.³¹ In Mount Airy Weber visits relatives of his who live there as farmers. Here (on the frontier between North Carolina and Virginia) he makes further studies of the American sects. He sees how clubs and orders (*Orden*) replace the decaying sect structure.

Weber concludes his American journey in New York. Here he combs the library of Columbia University with the purpose of finding literature and material for his study on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, of which the first part had been published early in 1904. Weber was surprised that he was able to stand the strain of this journey. He feels himself enriched and stimulated. With a new vigour he devotes himself to the continuation of his study on *The Protestant Ethic*.

This work is in all probability the best-known of all his writings outside Germany. It was first published in the form of two articles in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* and now forms the first part of vol. i of his *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*; part ii: *The Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism* has, unfortunately, not been included in Mr. Talcott Parsons' English translation to which R. H. Tawney has written an admirable foreword. Almost a whole library has been

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written on this subject since Weber opened the discussion, a discussion which soon became world-wide.³² The historic intricacies of Weber's work cannot be discussed here; what is important for our purpose is to understand that Weber analysed the beginnings of capitalism in order to appreciate more fully the significance and implications of capitalism in its contemporary phase. 'If any inner relationship between certain expressions of the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture is to be found,' writes Weber towards the beginning of his study, 'we must attempt to find it, for better or worse, not in its alleged more or less materialistic or at least anti-ascetic joy of living, but in its purely religious characteristics. Montesquieu says (*Esprit des Loix*, book xx, chap. 7) of the English that they had progressed the farthest of all peoples of the world in three important things: in piety, in commerce, and in freedom. Is it not possible that their commercial superiority and their adaptation to free political institutions are connected in some way with that record of piety which Montesquieu ascribes to them?'³³ Weber hardly answers this question in the course of his study, but he has certainly touched upon the nerve-centre of the British political system. With regard to the link between 'the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture' the concluding pages of part i, vol. i of the *Protestant Ethic* provide us with the answer: 'The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day with irresistible force determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the "saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment". But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. To-day the spirit of religious asceticism—whether finally, who knows?—has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer. The rosy blush of its laughing heir, the Enlighten-

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ment, seems also to be irretrievably fading, and the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs. Where the fulfilment of the calling cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and cultural values, or when, on the other hand, it need not be felt simply as economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the attempt to justify it at all. In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport.⁸⁴

We see that Weber's journey to the United States has borne rich fruit. When he returned and thought to resume the thread of his first article on the *Protestant Ethic*, he meant, as a letter of his indicates, to write 'cultural history',⁸⁵ yet in fact he is writing as a 'universal sociologist', attempting to understand and to explain the structures of social behaviour as it occurs in history. He still appears to be reluctant in using the term 'sociology', though it seems that between 1905 and 1910—perhaps under the influence of his friend Georg Simmel whose *Sociology* was published in 1908—he preferred the term sociology to the term social sciences.

Having ascertained the contemporary structure of occidental capitalistic rationalism, Weber asks himself who is going to live 'in this cage of the future'? His answer is prophetic in so far as it is still valid to-day: 'No one knows who will live in this cage of the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance. For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: 'Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved.'⁸⁶ Aldous Huxley in his *Brave New World* has convincingly illustrated the sociologist's prognosis.

Yet Weber's studies on the Protestant ethic give only an incomplete idea of his conception of a universal sociology. His *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* attempt to verify his findings by a comparative analysis of other world religions. (These studies are unfortunately not available in English.) In 1913 he writes a study on Confucianism and Taoism, during the first world war he extends his

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research towards Indian religions; reprinted now in vol. ii of the *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* under the title: *Hinduism and Buddhism*, finally in vol. iii we find a study on the *Ancient Jewish Religion*. Furthermore chapter iv of the second part of his posthumous work: *Economics and Society* (*Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* which again is not translated into English) represents the last stage of Weber's 'sociology of religion'.³⁷

The introduction³⁸ to the whole of his three volumes of *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, written in 1913, indicates clearly the universal aspect of Weber's sociology. Here he asks, why does science exist only in the West (in the sense that we recognize as valid to-day), why do we find systematic political thought as embodied in Aristotle only in the occident, why again are Roman and Canon Law only known here, why has rational harmonious music only appeared in the occident, why does the rational use of the Gothic vault as a means of distributing pressure and of roofing spaces of all forms not appear anywhere else? Furthermore the trained civil servant or official is the pillar of the modern state and of the economic life of the West.³⁹ And finally: why 'are parliaments of periodically elected representatives, with government by demagogues and party leaders as ministers responsible to the parliaments, peculiar to us, although there have, of course, been parties in the sense of organizations for exerting influence and gaining control of political power, all over the world? In fact, the State itself, in the sense of a political association with a rational, within the framework of a constitution, rationally ordained law, and an administration bound to rational rules of laws, administered by trained officials, is known, in this combination of characteristics, only in the occident.'⁴⁰ The same applies to capitalism: the most fateful force of modern life.

One realizes that Weber's whole sociological approach is intimately related to Marx's doctrines. Marx, too, has tested his sociological analysis of modern capitalism by comparisons with Indian and Chinese social structures. Moreover, the ultimate problem which Marx⁴¹ set out to solve: how can the dignity and freedom of men be made compatible with the inescapable 'fate' of capitalism was also the ultimate problem of Max Weber's political sociology. But it is important to bear in mind that there are roughly fifty years separating the two thinkers, if we can assume that Marx's fundamental conception of sociology is firmly based

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on the *Communist Manifesto*. While Marx still belonged to the age of European Enlightenment, Weber lived in our world, a world which has discovered that religions have not only economic roots. On the other hand those fifty years which separate Marx and Weber also explain how it was that Weber studied modern capitalism in a far more advanced stage. Consequently, he was able to see more clearly the intrinsic administrative complexities, particularly with regard to the ever-growing threat of modern bureaucratization. How can the individual maintain his independence in the presence of this total bureaucratization of our life?—this was from now on the guiding theme of Weber's political sociology. We shall have to study it in all its many variations.

The question may arise whether this interpretation of the contemporary structure (and its future trends) of our modern society does not contradict Weber's conception of the State as power-State. Is it compatible, we may perhaps ask, to state the conflict between a total bureaucratic rationalization and the dignity and the freedom of the individual as an inescapable and *universal* structure of the West (and in 1943 perhaps *also* of the East) and to maintain at the same time *raison d'état* as the ultimate principle of the power-State? Or did Weber solve this contradiction? This question must be put here because the reader of these pages might feel inclined to think that Weber had in the meantime given up the ideas which we have analysed in his inaugural lecture.

He has not. 'All political formations are formations of violence',⁴² we read in his main work *Economics and Society*, and in the same work the modern idea of the State is defined 'as the last source of all legitimate physical violence'.⁴³ It is, therefore, evident that the *Machtstaat* politician refutes the descriptive findings of the sociologist. How are we to explain this fact? In his interpretation of the Anglo-Saxon state structure, Weber has clearly seen the basic religious and moral element, but what he failed to realize is the phenomenon that this basic religious and moral element does not disappear in the modern British and American state structure, though it is covered by ever more secularized layers. Two years before Weber was born, Lord Acton pointed out the factors on which the peculiar strength of the British Constitution is built. 'The modern theory, which has swept away every authority except that of the State, and has made the sovereign

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power irresistible by multiplying those who share it, is *the enemy of that common freedom in which religious freedom is included* . . . (my italics). It recognizes liberty only in the individual, because it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority, and the right of conditional obedience deprived of the security of a limited command. . . .⁴⁴ From Acton onwards the pluralistic theory of the State has been steadily developed and refined by Maitland, Figgis, and Harold Laski as opposed to the theory of the power-State which ultimately paved the way for Nazism. Weber was unable to see the moral element inherent in any political power, provided human beings rose above the level of animals.

We can now safely turn to some more concrete applications of the universal sociological concepts Weber had gained. In 1905 the first Russian Revolution aroused his intense interest. He quickly learned Russian, enough to read Russian newspapers; breathless, as it were, he followed the revolutionary course. He sums up his reflections on the Revolution in two long articles which were published in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* (vols. xxii and xxiii); they are to our regret not incorporated into his collected works). Will Russia open herself to Western influences? he asks. Is there a possibility that *bourgeois* ideas and ideals may be victorious over the communist-agrarian tendency which threatens to unchain a strong and irresistible radical-socialist movement amongst the Russian proletariat which is growing as the result of the newly imported modern capitalism? The Russian Government failed to create guarantees against an arbitrary police system which used its power with all means of 'Asiatic insidiousness'.⁴⁵ Moreover—and here Weber reveals his own revolutionary principles against the background of Imperial Germany—'a revolution from below is not possible without the assistance or the tolerance of the *bourgeoisie*, likewise a canalization from above is not possible without its support'.⁴⁶

A comparison between the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution shows that in 1905 even the *bourgeois* representatives of the freedom-movement do not consider 'property' as 'holy'.⁴⁷ Yet for the time being, Weber assumes—and subsequent events have confirmed his assumption—that the 'holiness of property' will maintain its superiority over the social-revolutionary peasants' ideology. Weber admits that a constitutional Russia might be a stronger and more restless neighbour for Germany, because such a Russia would be

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more sensitive with regard to the instincts of the Russian masses. 'But let us not deceive ourselves: such a Russia will come by such means or otherwise.'⁴⁸ Russia should come now or soon to an agreement with Germany, 'while we are able, based on our strength, to understand each other on the chaos of questions which stand between us, instead of leaving these problems to our grandchildren, while in the meantime we allow all the ideal forces of these rising peoples to be set in motion against us'.⁴⁹ Again Weber has seen through the clouds of the future. To-day, indeed, victorious Russia decides on the battlefield her share in the future shaping of the world.

Weber still believes, though with a distinct sceptical note, in the political future of the *bourgeoisie*. Hope and scepticism are intimately interwoven in the following passage which is to be found in the first of his two articles on the Russian Revolution: 'Everywhere the framework of a new bondage is ready, waiting only for the slowing down of technical "progress" and for the victory of as yet "free" territory and "free" markets, to make the masses tractable to its compulsion. At the same time the increasing complexity of the economic system, its partial nationalization or "municipalization", and the territorial magnitude of national organisms, is creating ever more clerical work, an increasing specialization of labour and professional training in administration—and this means the creation of a bureaucratic caste. . . . Whatever spheres of "inalienable" personality and freedom are still unwon by the common people in the course of the next few generations, and while the economic and intellectual "revolution", the much-maligned "subjectivism" (by which, and *by which alone*, the individual has been made self-dependent), still remains unbroken, may *perhaps*—once the world has become economically "full" and intellectually "sated" remain unachieved by them, for as far as our weak eyes can pierce the impenetrable mists of the future of mankind. . . .'⁵⁰ Will they—liberal social groups in Germany—*bourgeoisie* and working class, rally to their task? To the answering of this burning question—in theory and practice—Max Weber now devotes all his strength.

How in the meantime has the German political situation developed? A letter to Friedrich Naumann of December 1906 places us abreast of it. The *Reichstag* had just been dissolved because the Centre and the Social Democratic Party had voted against the additional budget for German South-west Africa as a protest against colonial misadministra-

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tion. Weber discusses the possibilities of an election platform. Moreover, the solution of the Tangier crisis had just prevented the outbreak of a European war: 'At no price', writes Weber, 'the dangerously ready formula: For the Kaiser against the Centre Party with its lust for power. Such a policy would revenge itself terribly. The degree of contempt with which we are met as a nation abroad (in Italy, U.S.A., everywhere) and justified contempt—that is decisive—because we tolerate the régime of this man, has become a power-factor of first-class significance in world policy. . . . No man and no party which cultivates democratic and national ideals should accept responsibility for this régime whose continuation threatens our position in the world more than any colonial problem whatsoever. We should blame and oppose the Centre party *not* because it questions 'the power of command' of the Kaiser or even less because it aimed for power according to the number of its deputies, for control of the colonial administration, for parliamentary co-government (*Nebenregierung*). The Centre Party is to blame because it has, as the dominating party in Parliament, advanced and supported the system of *sham* constitutionalism. . . . It has maintained a "parliamentary patronage" behind the scenes: the sugar candy by which since a decade the dominating parties, Centre Party, but likewise Conservatives and National Liberals, have been incorporated into the dominating personal régime of our sham constitutionalism. . . .'⁶¹ Weber therefore asks for the formulation of an election platform which is against the Centre Party as the party supporting sham constitutionalism and he asks at the same time for the support of the opposition groups within the National Liberal movement and finally for the support of the trade union elements within the Social Democratic Party. Weber's criticism of the Centre Party is important because this criticism implies that German political Catholicism was not *eo ipso* a democratic element within the framework of German society. The Centre Party was from its beginnings during the *Kultur-Kampf* period under Bismarck to its end in 1933 a political party based on a *Weltanschauung*, yet at the same time it embraced the greatest degree of economic and social antagonism: it had industrialists, big estate owners on the one side, Catholic trade unions and lower middle-class groups on the other. Not only under the Imperial régime, but also under the Weimar Republic, German political Catholicism has always been decisive in tipping the scales. It was able to swing the balance to 'the

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right' or to 'the left', towards reaction or progress. The party machine of the Centre Party being controlled by what Weber termed the '*Kaplanokratie*' explains the remarkable stability of the Catholic electorate in Germany about which statistical details will be found in the appendix.⁵³ Now the very fact of the *Kaplanokratie* indicates the ultramontane character of Catholicism, indeed of any political Catholicism in whatever country it may be found. An adequate interpretation of German political Catholicism requires therefore the linking up of the national politics with the international policy of the Holy See. The Centre Party was never a national party—in Weber's sense—nor can political Catholicism ever be of a purely national character. It seems that Weber—in this respect his attitude is not much different from that of his friend Naumann—being prevented by his strong Protestant bias (Protestant is, of course, meant not in the sense of the Protestant Church)—hardly appreciated the ambivalent policy of the Centre Party whose history, in spite of Bachem's monumental work⁵⁴, has still to be written.

Weber's attitude towards the German Conservative Party is evident from all that has been said hitherto in these pages. In November 1908 he makes this comment on the Conservative Party—again in a letter to Friedrich Naumann: 'Everything depends now on writing in the largest letters, so that the whole country may read it: the Conservative Party bears the responsibility for the continuation of the "personal régime". . . . A dilettante is holding the threads of our policy in his hands (every legitimate monarch who is not a Frederick II is a dilettante; and this is the will of the Conservative Party). This is valid for the High Command in war as for the political leadership in peace. The consequence is that as long as this state of affairs persists a "world policy" becomes an impossibility.'⁵⁵ Weber then compares the King of England with the position of the German Kaiser—historically and from a constitutional point of view not quite accurately. What he writes—still in the same letter—is nevertheless interesting: 'The King of England has ambition and power, the German Kaiser is vain, and is content with the appearance of power; as a consequence of the system, not of the person. Kingdom of influence *versus* Kingdom of prerogative'—Weber here uses English terms—as this antagonism has been formulated in England. The German Kaiser is the "shadow-emperor", not the King of England—as judged from a historic view. . . .'⁵⁶ Weber con-

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cludes with a formula which is almost an epitaph on Imperial Germany, written only ten years before this epoch of German history came to its close: 'The dynasty of the Hohenzollern knows only the corporal's form of power: to command, to obey, to stand to attention, to boast.' . . .

It remains now to inquire into Weber's attitude towards the Social Democratic Party. In 1903 the Social Democratic Party had secured 81 seats in the *Reichstag*, as compared with 100 Centre Party deputies. The Social Democratic Party was then the second largest party in the German diet. Were the Socialists in Weber's opinion politically more mature now than they were in 1894, when in his inaugural address he had examined their qualification for political leadership of the nation? In an important debate on the 'Constitution and administrative organization of towns' which took place at a congress of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* in 1907, Weber expresses the following views on the Social Democratic Party: 'The important question is, which . . . has most to fear in the long run, bourgeois society or Social Democracy? I, personally, think the latter, at least so far as concerns those elements in it that are exponents of *revolutionary ideology*. That there are now certain conflicts within the Social Democratic bureaucracy is plain to see, and if, on the one hand, the material interests of professional politicians, and, on the other, the revolutionary ideology, could develop unhindered, and if, further, the Social Democrats were no longer as now excluded from the *Kriegervereine* (the associations of ex-service men of 1870-1), and were allowed to enter the ecclesiastical administration at present closed to them, *then* serious internal problems would begin for the party. Then its revolutionary ardour would indeed be in grave danger. . . . Then we should see that Social Democracy would never permanently conquer the towns or the State, but that on the contrary the State would conquer the Social Democratic Party.' Again Max Weber anticipated the future fate of a political institution. When, after 1918, the Social Democratic Party together with the Democratic and the Centre Party took over the Imperial State administration, things happened exactly as Weber prophesied.

The German State conquered the Republican parties. From 1920 onwards the history of the Weimar Republic was only a rearguard action against the revitalized social forces on which the German State structure had been built under Bismarck: Army, *Junkers*, big industrialists, and the higher strata of the Civil Service. Thus far Weber's

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prophecy was correct. What he could *not* see in 1907 was the fact that the German *bourgeoisie* itself was destroyed and finally eliminated in this process; Social Democracy and *bourgeoisie* were replaced by a new mass movement which was initially based on the employees, clerical workers, etc., those important new social groups which stand in between the proletariat and the *bourgeoisie* and which have been termed the *Mittelschichten*. These groups were—before and after 1920—joined by those who were impoverished either by war or inflation. It was in 1933, when symbolically enough Hindenburg shook hands with the unknown corporal of the first world war at the grave of Frederick II in Potsdam, that the old and the new—the National Socialist Germany—met to ally themselves for a second world war. Soon the old social forces which meant to lead and to tame the new mass movement were for their part eliminated, subdued, or incorporated into the Third Reich. It seemed opportune to link up Weber's analysis of Germany's political structure before the first world war with Nazi Germany, because present and past are indissolubly interwoven.

The continuation of Weber's interpretation of the Social Democratic Party is not less relevant: 'I should have liked to invite our German princes on to the platform at the Mannheim party conference, just to show them how Russian Socialists, sitting there as spectators, were horrified at the spectacle of this party! They had really believed it to be revolutionary, they had admired it as the greatest acquisition to German civilization and as having an immense revolutionary bearing for the future of the whole world, but now only the smug inn-keeper face, the physiognomy of the petty *bourgeois*, caught the eye. . . . I think that no prince would continue to fear this party which has no real source of power, whose political impotence is manifest even to-day to all who choose to see. If the party seeks political power and yet fails to control the one effective means of power, *military power* (our italics), in order to overthrow the State, its dominance in the community and in public corporations and associations would only show its political impotence more distinctly, and the more it thought to rule simply as a political party and not objectively, the sooner it would be discredited.'⁶⁶

The inherent contradiction within the Social Democratic Party between a revolutionary policy and a policy of gradualism—a gradual penetration into the capitalist State, mainly by means of universal

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franchise—is of fundamental importance for any understanding of the socialist movement in Germany. This fundamental contradiction was not settled until the Nazi movement crushed the Social Democratic Party in 1933. Gradualism and revolutionism came into conflict in 1918 with Ebert and his friends standing for gradualism—the independent Socialists and particularly the so-called Spartacus movement under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg (out of whom later on grew the Communist Party) adhering to a non-compromising policy with the capitalist state. Indeed this split between two entirely different social philosophies explains to a large extent the political impotence of German socialism, if not of Western socialism generally. A political party cannot—or, should we say, ought not to?—have two structurally entirely different policies: you are either for the ‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’ as the only means to lay the foundations for a socialist society or you accept gradualism. But you cannot have it both ways. Moreover, it is not a question whether your interpretation of Marx is right or wrong which will decide that a revolutionary or a gradualist policy is the appropriate one. A ‘theology’ based on Marx is able to quote texts for both views.⁵⁷

When Weber spoke the sentences quoted above the German socialist movement had just gone through an intense struggle which arose over a book by Edward Bernstein: *The presuppositions of socialism and the tasks of the Social Democratic Party*. This book was the classic exposition of German gradualism or revisionism. Bernstein had been driven into exile by Bismarck. In London he came under the influence of the early Fabians and observed the sound gradualism of the British Trade Unions. He learnt in the British intellectual climate to doubt Marx’s dialectical method: ‘The aim, whatever it may be, is nothing to me, the movement is everything.’ Bernstein also realized that 2,000,000 employees in Germany cannot be regarded as the ‘proletarians of commerce’. Naturally enough his German party bosses were angry. They were inclined to accept Bernstein’s powerful criticism of the Marxian theory as a contribution to ‘open questions’, but with regard to political tactics they refused to declare themselves as bearers of a democratic Socialist Party, as Bernstein⁵⁸ had demanded. The Utopian revolutionary Marxian slogans were, to be sure, much more attractive slogans for the new urban masses which by the rapid expansion of German industry left their villages, thirsting for new beliefs since

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Christianity had—at least for the time being and perhaps finally—lost its hold over them.

Weber's criticism of the Social Democratic Party which we had to discuss at some length, was not his only contribution to the deliberations of the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*. Brilliant debater as he was, we see him take part in the congresses of the *Verein* in 1905, 1907, 1909, and 1911. (These speeches deserve a close study; we give an exemplar in our appendix to this book.)⁶⁰ They touch, apart from the relationship of the socialist movement to the State, such topics as cartels and trusts, economic communal enterprises, productivity of the economic system, problems of psychology of the working classes. Weber's world is now indeed a universal cosmos. His hunger for the most widely dispersed facts is insatiable. His intellectual life seems full to the breaking point.

In 1910 and 1912 he attends the first two congresses of German sociologists. Sociology, it seems, is now a firmly established science. The report Weber gives on the preparations for a 'sociology of the press'⁶¹ at the congress of German sociologists in 1910 most certainly ranks amongst the finest pieces of work he has ever done. As orator and debater he is less difficult, more direct. His immense knowledge—unsurpassed in scope since Leibniz—is always present for ready application. 'What are', asks Weber in this report, 'the characteristics of publicity to-day, what are its future trends, which things are publicised and which not? If the British parliament 150 years ago forced journalists to appear before the House on their knees to apologize for breach of privilege if they reported on the House's sessions, and if to-day, by the mere threat of not publishing its numerous speeches parliament is forced to its knees, parliamentarianism and the position of the press must have changed. . . .'⁶¹ What are the power relations which create publicity, particularly the conditions of economic power? Do we have to expect a development towards press trusts? How does the press get its material? What is the position of the great news bureaux and how are they internationally related to each other? What is the position of the creative journalist in this intrinsically rationalized system of the modern press? And finally: to what kind of reading does the modern newspaper reader get accustomed? Weber does not answer these questions when he introduces to his learned audience the subject of a 'sociology of the press', but in pondering these questions, it becomes evident that Weber's mind fully embraced the vast ramifica-

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tions of the press in our modern life. While realizing its world character, he compares the British, American, and French press with the German and reflects critically (or as he prefers to say 'objectively') on their national characteristics.

This European outlook had been strengthened by new journeys to France and England. Frau Marianne Weber describes how his powerful mind is never tired of absorbing new realities. Of Weber Goethe's verse in *Faust* is indeed truly valid:

Zum Sehen geboren,
Zum Schauen bestellt . . .

New friends join the old ones in Heidelberg. Among them was the psychologist Karl Jaspers, whose *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* stimulated Weber immensely, when he formulated in 1913 'Some Principles of an interpretative Sociology'.⁶² An analysis of this essay as of similar of Weber's attempts to clarify the methodological foundations of his sociology is outside the scope of this book, being of too specialized a character. It suffices to quote here the first few lines of *Economics and Society* where Weber presents his 'sociological principles' in their final form. He writes: 'Sociology (in the sense meant here with regard to this very ambiguously used term) is a science which will interpret and understand social action and by that explain it causally in its process and its effects. "Action" is meant in this respect as human attitude (*Verhalten*)—either inner reaction or exterior action, abstention or endurance (*Dulden*), if and as far as the agent or the agents combine with this attitude a meaning (*Sinn*). "Social" action is such an action by which the agent's or the agents' meaning is related to the attitude of others and orientated by it in its process.' These few sentences give perhaps some idea why we refrain in these pages from a full discussion of Weber's methodology.

Friedrich Gundolf, one of Stefan George's younger friends, also comes often to Weber's house; even the exclusive master himself is, now and then, Max Weber's guest. Weber was perhaps less interested in George's poetry than in the curious phenomenon that an intelligent and noble-minded circle of people united to create an artificial myth amidst a world whose stern realities their nerves were not strong enough to bear.

Fearlessly, like a medieval knight, Weber faced the future. Let us profit again from his prophetic power while he reflects at the

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conclusion of his work on *Die Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum*⁶⁵ which, in fact, is a sociological history of the Ancient World. What can we learn for our time from a universal sociological interpretation of the Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Jewish, Greek, Hellenistic, and ancient Roman cultures? Perhaps—after all—history has a lesson to offer. 'Every bureaucracy has the tendency to increase, thereby achieving the same effect. Thus our contemporary German bureaucracy. And while in the Ancient World the policy of the *polis* had to be the 'pace-maker' for capitalism, to-day capitalism is the pace-maker for bureaucratizing the economic system. Let us imagine that coal, iron, all mining and metallurgic products, in addition alcoholic products, sugar, tobacco, matches, in short all mass products, to-day already produced by cartels, taken over by State or State-controlled enterprises, moreover, the State-run controlled big estates multiplied . . . workshops and co-operatives for the needs of army and State officials also administered by the State, inland and foreign shipping controlled by the State, also all railways, etc. . . . and all these enterprises held in bureaucratic order, . . . all the rest corporatively with numerous qualifications academic and otherwise, the type of the *rentier paisible* generalized—thus under a militarist-dynastic régime, the position prevailing under the later Roman Emperors would be achieved best on technically more advanced foundations. The modern German *bourgeois* has not more in common with the qualities of his ancestors during the period of the late Middle Ages than had the Athenian under the Roman Emperors with his ancestors who fought at Marathon. "Order" is his slogan, in most cases also when he is a "Social Democrat". With regard to our society it is highly probable that bureaucratization will master capitalism—some time, as it happened in antiquity. So "order" will replace "anarchy of production", similar in principle as under the Roman Emperors, or even more so under the Ptolemies or during the "new Egyptian Empire", and let no one believe that to serve in an army, bureaucratized and provided with war machines, drilled in barracks, could offer a counter-weight, or that the modern military robot within dynastic States should have any connection with the civic military spirit of the past.'⁶⁶ These sentences are characteristic of a concrete and universal sociology which lays bare the links which hold ancient, medieval, and modern worlds together. Indeed: was the cage for the enslavement of our modern life *finally* ready?

IV

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Perhaps nobody since Marx saw more clearly the mechanized and totally rationalist character of the capitalist age. Weber, indeed, surpassed Marx because he followed the impact of the 'steel' age on the most subtle sphere of human activity: religion. Yet it seems that there is a heroic, or if you like, a romantic element in him which tends to defy the clear-sightedness of his intellect. It was not a play with words when we said of Weber that he reminded us of a medieval knight. His attitude towards Emmy Baumgarten was, as it were, symbolic. He seems always to have felt a deep impulse to protect the weaker sex. Never did he accept the slightest sign of injustice towards those whom he regarded as the weak. (Marianne Weber's *Lebensbild* is full of examples.) He may have had his doubts about the justification of an alleged or real prominence of Jews with regard to certain spheres of German life—before and after 1918—doubts which may be explained, though perhaps not quite justified, by family tradition, 'education' as student and reserve officer, yet wherever he met anti-Semitism personally (e.g. concerning his friend Georg Simmel), he did everything in his power to fight injustice. He felt that modern life threatened our vital instincts and virtues. And indeed his own life, for years threatened by over-sensitivity, is a clear demonstration of this deep-seated fear of being devoured by the Moloch of the machine. It is this attitude, which we find also in his contemporary Charles Péguy, which explains this personal heroism, in spite of a fundamentally clear view of how incompatible personal heroism is with the trends of the machine age. It is a heroism of the *quand-même* (which Nietzsche had already taught).

It is perhaps not easy for the British reader to understand this emotional atmosphere which in August 1914 came to its climax or, to put it differently, faced its greatest test. R. M. Rilke, the greatest

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German poet since Hoelderlin, has perhaps adequately expressed what Max Weber and many of his friends may have felt in those summer weeks in 1914:

Zum erstenmal seh ich dich aufstellen,
hörengesagter, fernster, unglaublicher Kriegs-Gott.
Wie so dicht zwischen die friedlichen Furcht,
furchtbares Handeln gesät war, plötzlich erwachsenes.
Gestern war es noch klein, bedurfte der Nahrung, mannshoch
steht es schon da: morgen
überwächst es den Mann. Denn der glühende Gott
reißt mit Einem das Wachstum
aus dem wurzelnden Volk, und die Ernte beginnt . . .
Endlich ein Gott. Da wir den friedlichen oft
nicht mehr ergriffen, ergreift uns plötzlich der Schlacht-Gott,
schleudert den Brand; und über dem Herzen voll Heimat
schreit, den er donnernd bewohnt, sein rötlicher Himmel.¹

Another feeling may have prevailed in Weber. He was a historian, he had strong political beliefs and instincts, concealed and revealed only to trusted friends under the régime of Wilhelm II. Might this war not bring Germany nearer towards democracy? This ostensible new unity, which the poet expresses, will it be realized in institutions? Is not the parliamentarization of the *Bundesrat* overdue and is the Prussian *Dreiklassenwahlrecht* not the most reactionary election law in Europe? Meanwhile—on the 15th of October 1914—Weber writes to Professor Toennies: 'This war is with all its ugliness great and wonderful, it is worth while experiencing it. . . .'² He regrets that he is too old to fight himself. He is fifty now. According to his rank as a captain, Max Weber is in charge of reserve military hospitals in Heidelberg. His brothers are all at the front or in garrison service. His brother-in-law was killed in the battle of Tannenberg. 'What peace is conceivable? And when? Hundreds of thousands are dying through the terrible incapability of our diplomacy—this unfortunately cannot be denied, and therefore I cannot see, *even in the event of a successful ending* (our italics) a really permanent peace for us. . . .'³

The note of pessimism in spite of the great military victories of the German armies is striking, Weber is not a hurrah patriot. It is not a pleasant gift to see a dark and uncertain future when everything in the

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present seems bright and full of promise. There was always a kind of sad loneliness around Weber which is so striking when we see pictures of him. The prophet is nowhere at home. In April 1915 he writes to his best friend, his aged mother, from Heidelberg: ' . . . that fate and experience of this great and wonderful war—in spite of everything—keep me in an office and "pass me by" does not matter. . . . We have proved that we are a people of great culture (*grosses Kulturvolk*): human beings who live amidst a refined culture, yet who even stand up against the horrors of war (which is no achievement for a Senegalese!) and then, in spite of it, return basically decent like the majority of our soldiers—this is genuinely humane. . . . This experience will remain whatever the final result may be—and it looks now dark enough, if Italy is not calmed.'⁴ Again Weber warns against facile optimism; to his mother he also reveals the Péguy attitude of his inner self.

Towards the end of 1915 Weber discusses 'war-aims' in a correspondence with the editor of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the leading south-west German liberal newspaper. He is 'against any (European) or eastern annexations'.⁵ But it is worth while to examine this 'no annexation policy' a little more closely: Weber is for Polish and Baltic 'autonomous' national States in the east: 'with the right for us to build and garrison fortresses (north of Warsaw), also to build strategic railways; the same conditions for Austria south of Warsaw. Apart from that: customs' union with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, otherwise full autonomy (sic!). No German settlement policy outside our frontiers.'⁶ With regard to the west, Max Weber proposes permanent military occupation of Luxembourg; occupation for a period of twenty years of Liège and Namur until Belgium fortifies and defends Ostend and her southern frontier. 'Nothing else (in Europe). Only the military indispensable, no "annexations".'⁷ It is open to doubt whether Weber's war aims were *de facto* much different as compared with the war aims of the *Alldeutsche*. More subtle they certainly were. Weber still firmly believed in the conception of the State as power-State, a conviction to which he adhered to his death. Germany, the German people, is *his* supreme law.

In 1916 another fear is haunting Max Weber's mind. German diplomacy must prevent the United States' entry into the war. At all costs. If this cannot be prevented of what use is a committee on Central

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European problems which Friedrich Naumann wants him to join? If America enters the war on the side of the Allies 'within nine months or within a year quite different "problems" will occupy our mind'.⁸ Reluctantly he follows Naumann's invitation. And the famous book *Mittel-Europa*, a predecessor of Hitler's 'European Order' programme, is published in the same year.⁹

Once again Weber has warned in vain. If the Americans enter the war, what will it mean? 'Another two years of war, the ruin of our economic system.'¹⁰ He does not believe in Tirpitz' *U-boat* demagoguery. Weber has a clear appreciation of the American industrial potential. It will be decisive for the final outcome of the war.

We are in 1917. The United States have declared war against Germany. *Alea jacta est*. Weber now devotes his whole strength to the preparation of Germany's inner reform. Germany's, and particularly Prussia's, democratization must be taken in hand. 'Not a shot would I fire, not a penny war loan would I subscribe to, if this war were not a national war: if it were only concerned with the maintenance of our state structure, or that we should keep this incapable dynasty and our unpolitical civil service, I would not support it.'¹¹ These sentences are to be found in a letter to Professor Hans Ehrenberg. In the same letter his programme for a democratic reform announces itself: 'I do not care about the form of the State, if only politicians and not dilettante fools like Wilhelm II and the like rule the country. . . . I see now no other way than ruthless parliamentarization—*quand-même*, to freeze out these people. The civil servants must be subordinated to parliament. Altogether and without exception. They are technicians. . . . *Forms of State are for me techniques like any other machinery* (our italics). I would attack parliament and defend the monarch, if the latter were a politician. . . .'¹²

Are forms of State really only techniques? To put this question can only mean to answer in the negative. It is impossible to separate the form of the State from its moral structure. 'Violence' is not sufficient to define the essence of the State. Forms of State are indissolubly bound up with the respective norms of the State. Max Weber turns again to the British example as becomes evident from the following passage, taken from a letter to Professor Lesser (June 1917): 'That the old leaders (e.g. Bennigsen in 1890) were still "alive", did not mean anything at all. They were "old", used up, parliament was broken. It is

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not true that they only "talked". They had created all institutions of the *Reich*, including Bismarck—in spite of the "legend". No, everybody knew it after 1878: it does not matter what they say and do—Bismarck acts (later Bismarck and the Centre Party) by virtue of extra-parliamentary power. Consequently nobody was any longer interested. This is different in England. There parliament is the place where leaders are elected. This is the reason why everybody pays attention to what is being done there. So was it with us, as long as with regard to inner policy we had a parliamentary government: 1867–78. After the breaking up of the great parties this came to an end. "Statesmen" grow to-day only in the working soil, e.g. in powerful parliaments, such parliaments which provide the responsible leaders from their midst (with us *forbidden* by law; Article 9 of the Constitution of the *Reich*¹³. . . .) Here Weber gives an instructive retrospective view on the structure of German politics from 1867. Moreover, he indicates his intention to formulate a programme for a new political structure for Germany. To this programme we must now devote our attention.

During the summer of 1917 Weber wrote a series of articles in *Die Frankfurter Zeitung* which he published subsequently as a pamphlet under the title: *Parliament and Government in a newly ordered Germany*.¹⁴ An analysis of this pamphlet is indispensable for a fuller understanding of his political sociology.

Its first article deals with 'Bismarck's legacy'. On this not much can be said without repeating what is already to be found in the previous pages of this book. Weber gives final form to his prolonged reflections on Bismarck and his influence on the modern political structure of Germany. He writes: 'Bismarck left behind as a political heritage a nation without any political education, far below the level which, in this respect, it had reached twenty years earlier. Above all he left behind a nation without any political will, accustomed to allow the great statesman at its head to look after its policy for it. Moreover, as a consequence of his misuse of the monarchy as a cover for his own interests in the struggle of political parties, he left a nation accustomed to submit, under the label of constitutional monarchy, to anything which was decided for it, without criticizing the political qualifications of those who now occupied Bismarck's empty place and who with incredible ingenuousness now took the reins of power into their hands.'¹⁵ We must bear in mind that Weber wrote these sentences

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in 1917. He never lacked the courage to say what he felt needed saying. Under the régime of the unknown corporal, if he had experienced it, Max Weber would have died in a concentration camp.

The political docility of the German nation is perhaps not only to be explained as a consequence of Bismarck's statesmanship. There are two powerful sociological components which had resulted in forming this docility long before Bismarck. The one is German Protestantism, the other military conscription. While Luther directed the German individual soul to its mystical depth, he accepted 'order' and 'authority' with regard to the worldly state. Personal religiosity and State were thus fundamentally separated. Once the religious soul was assured of its intimate mystical union with its God, the individual could submit to State obedience, being convinced that the sphere of the State could never interfere with his 'real' depth. So the 'free Christian' easily became the slave of the State.¹⁶ The Prussian State was predominantly Protestant. Church and Army concluded an alliance which explains, at least historically, what has been termed here, political docility.

In addition the impact of army 'education' on the German national character can hardly be overestimated. It began perhaps with Friedrich II who, according to Hintze, used his crippled N.C.O.'s for village teachers, 'an institution which corresponded more to the Prussian military State than to the needs of education.'¹⁷ All able-bodied men in Germany for more than a hundred years went through the 'educational' machinery of the German Army; here, too, blind belief in 'order' and 'authority' were the guiding norms. They permeated the whole of German society. It has been said that the discipline of the German working-class organizations was a reflection of army discipline. This observation is probably sociologically correct. The German workers obeyed their leaders, perhaps to a large extent against their better judgement, until their final doom was inevitable.

These remarks seemed necessary before we proceeded to the second part of Weber's pamphlet on *Parliament and Government*. He discusses now the possibilities, how the threatening 'new despotism' of the civil service may be checked and controlled, in other words, how within the modern mass state civil service is related to political leadership. The discussion is introduced by the following sentences: "In a modern state, real power, which acts not through parliamentary speeches nor through the pronouncements of the Crown, but through

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everyday administration, lies necessarily and inevitably in the hands of the bureaucracy, both military and civil. For the modern officer of high rank even directs battles from his desk.¹⁸ In the State and the Army, in Church and industry, the same tendency towards bureaucratization is evident. Closer analysis of this modern process of universal bureaucratization shows that the new army of public and private officials, clerks and employees is increasing faster than the industrial proletariat proper. As it is a simplification to regard the proletariat as a simple homogeneous mass without any differentiations in skill, traditions, behaviour patterns, and social aspirations, so it would be wrong to assume that the proletariat forms 'the majority' of the employed population within the modern highly industrialized state. On both these points Weber insisted and thereby considerably corrected the traditional Marxian interpretation of modern society.

With regard to another problem Weber insisted also on a reinterpretation of Marxism. Marx drew attention to the separation of the worker from the means of production. Yet in the modern mass state we are confronted with a much wider phenomenon. 'This fundamental principle', we read in *Parliament and Government*, 'the separation of the worker from the means of production in the economic sphere, from the means of waging war in the army, the means of administration in public service, money in all spheres, the means of research in universities and laboratories is the common and basic foundation of a modern power-political and military state and of capitalist private enterprise. In both cases direction of power lies in the hands of that authority, which the bureaucracy (judges, civil servants, officers, foremen, clerks, non-commissioned officers) either directly or indirectly obeys. It is a characteristic feature of all these institutions, whose existence and function, both in theory and practice, is inseparably bound up with this concentration of the means of production.'¹⁹ It is evident that Weber uses here the term 'means of production' in a much wider sense than Marx. By including 'the concentration of political means' Weber has provided us with a key for understanding fascism in its various forms.

Now two points in Weber's interpretation of the modern mass state deserve particular emphasis. (1) The new army of officials, clerks, employees, etc. mentioned above, are sociologically of a fundamentally different type from the industrial worker. These groups dislike

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the proletarian Marxist ideology, which promises them, first a proletarian future and finally socialism. They prefer to rise instead of to sink in the social scale. These *Mittelschichten*,³⁰ as they have been called by German sociologists of the Weber school and which have played such a fatal role during the rise of National Socialism in Germany, demand their own constructive place in modern mass society, and that society, as may be seen from the German example, which does not give these new groups a positive function in a new social system, lies dangerously exposed to fascism.

(2) If we accept Weber's thesis that real power in the modern state rests with the bureaucracy, how can the 'new despotism' of this group be effectively controlled and confined to its proper sphere? Weber gave deep thought to the answer of this question and he proposed first: democratic selection of political leaders, and secondly, he insisted upon effective parliamentary control of the threatening autocracy of the bureaucrats. But how is a democratic election of political leaders possible? Are not political parties likewise dominated by bureaucracies? For the old political parties with their organizational system of local notabilities are disappearing. In France, maintains Weber, the very fact that political parties lack bureaucratic machines explains their parliamentary inefficiency. Weber had read Ostrogorski's admirable study on *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* carefully; and Robert Michels, whose work *Sociology of Political Parties* was published in 1911, was his close friend. Moreover, Weber had observed for almost thirty years the perhaps most highly organized political party in Europe: the German Social Democratic Party.

A few lines taken from *Economics and Society* serve to illustrate to what extent Weber had penetrated into the intrinsic complexities of a party sociology. 'The significance of legal parties,' he writes, 'because of their, in principle, voluntary (based on free choice) foundations, is, for all practical purposes, as follows: that the business of politics is in fact the business of group interests (i.e. political and therefore ideological participants, concerned with power as such). That means: (a) power lies in the hands of the party chiefs and their assistants; (b) the chief function of active party members is to applaud, though under certain conditions and in the last resort, they may take part in party control, in debate or remonstrance or in party revolution; (c) the passive but associate masses (the electorate and the voters) are only

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there to be won over at elections. Their vote to be regarded by the party machine only as a means to an end in the struggle for power; (d) the party Maecenases remain regularly (though not always) hidden.'²¹

It is beyond the scope of this book to inquire whether Weber in these over-condensed sentences has not again dwelt too much on political technique: thus separating political technique from traditions and moral valuations which are in fact interwoven with the power-element. Furthermore: the transition from the old party system based on notabilities, to the modern one, based on bureaucratic organization, does not proceed by a sudden break. The old structures, particularly in countries with long-standing political traditions like France and England, are mixed up with the modern organizational forms; and this sometimes to the advantage of the latter. Finally: it seems that Weber by regarding politics as power-technique underestimated historical features even with regard to organizational techniques. What we mean is this: if one compares the history of the British Labour Movement with the history of the German Social Democratic Party, it might be said, that while in the former the nonconformist chapel played the sociologically formative role, it was the public house which stood at the cradle (and the grave) of the latter, though it seems that recently the formula of 'the survival of the wettest' may also be applied to English party politics. Weber has not escaped the danger to which sociology so easily falls a prey of simplifying problems by a too ready use of generalizations (or ideal types, *Idealtypen*, to use his own terminology).

We can now return to the second part of *Parliament and Government*. 'A parliamentary leader differs from a bureaucrat or a civil servant 'by seeking political power with its responsibility'.²² Parliament, according to Weber, must be the place where political leaders are elected. Again British political institutions provide the German theorist with his norm.

Parliament with its many heads, Weber explains, cannot 'rule' and make politics. The whole mass of the deputies follows only the one or the few 'leaders' who form the cabinet, and obey them blindly, as long as they are successful.²³ Small leading groups alone determine political actions: 'This Caesarian (plebiscitarian) element is indestructible within mass states.'²⁴ This tendency prevails also in England. In part v of *Parliament and Government* where Weber discusses 'par-

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liamentarization and democratization', he uses the position of Mr. Lloyd George as British Prime Minister as an example of plebiscitary selection of a political leader: 'his position rests as a matter of fact not on the confidence of parliament and its parties, but on the confidence of the masses of the country and of the fighting army. Parliament accepts . . . this situation. There is, therefore, a contrast between plebiscitary and parliamentary selection of political leaders. But that does not mean that Parliament is useless. In England it acts as a guarantee against the plebiscitarian trustee of the masses: (1) by continuity, and (2) by the controlling power of its position; (3) by the guarantee and maintenance of citizens' rights against him; (4) by a regular political safeguard against politicians using parliamentary business to win the favour of the masses for themselves; (5) by peaceful means of eliminating "dictators" who lose the support of the masses.'^{as} Doubtless there is an important element of a plebiscitarian character in every modern mass state. As far as England is concerned this element has perhaps not been sufficiently elucidated by constitutional lawyers and sociologists. The era of state-controlled or at least state-influenced radio and picture theatre has even strengthened the plebiscitarian tendencies and it does not seem that the immediate future will weaken them. Still as long as the British Parliament functions and as long as the Press (daily and weekly) has enough liberty to express public opinion, the plebiscitarian dangers may be regarded as sufficiently checked and controlled though it might be important to bear in mind that 'eternal vigilance' is the essence of democratic government.

Political leadership exists only within a parliament that *works* and not only *talks*. Weber shows further that the British parliamentary system, particularly with regard to the parliamentary committee system, may teach the Continental constitutional lawyer two more things: (1) the British parliamentary committee system trains the British politician in concrete administrative work; (2) it provides him with a machinery to control the Civil Service. For the House of Commons can set up a select committee on anything it pleases. Moreover, such a select committee can take evidence from outsiders, and it can also, provided the House of Commons has resolved to do so, take evidence on oath.

In this way Weber contrasts the *negative* sham parliament of the German Reichstag with the working and *positive* parliament of the

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British. The so-called *enquête* law of the Weimar Constitution originated from the British constitutional practice.

'One critical reservation is perhaps relevant here. It is doubtful whether the fact that the British parliament is—in Weber's sense—a positive and working institution is a sufficient guarantee for the rotation and the rise of new political leadership. The bureaucracies of the parties exert a strong influence, particularly in as much as they are linked up with Trade Unions and other 'functional' organizations, inside parliament. Party secretaries and party leaders, even if they are old and played out, rarely resign in favour of younger and more vigorous men. In this respect only pressure by public opinion and the rare voluntary example of the old leaders can perhaps prevent the danger of fossilization of our contemporary political systems.

We do not propose to go further with the discussion of Max Weber's pamphlet on *Parliament and Government* which certainly ranks amongst the most remarkable studies on politics ever written. (It is to be hoped that a full English translation of it will be available to students in the not too distant future.)

His appeal to the German ruling class that the elimination of civil service domination within German politics, the abolition of the Prussian three-class franchise law and complete democratization of governments and all political institutions were the paramount conditions of maintaining the unity of the German nation, was of no avail.

Weber was indeed a lone prophet. In his studies on the Jewish prophets, to which we have already referred above, he finds an outlet for his despair. In Jeremiah's prayers he found comfort and relief: 'I sat not in the assembly of the mockers, nor rejoiced; I sat alone because of thy hand: for thou hast filled me with indignation. Why is my pain perpetual, and my wound incurable, which refuseth to be healed? Will thou be altogether unto me as a liar, and as waters that fail? Therefore thus saith the Lord, If thou return, then will I bring thee again, and thou shall stand before me: and if thou take forth the precious from the vile, thou shalt be as my mouth; let them return unto thee; but return not thou unto them. And I will make thee unto this people a fenced brasen wall; and they shall fight against thee, but they shall not prevail against thee: for I am with thee to save thee, saith the Lord.'²² It is revealing for Weber's moral attitude to compare this passage with his own comments: 'He (Jeremiah) seems often, as it

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were, to relish the idea of the horror of the disaster which he prophesied as certain to come to his own people. And yet on the other side—and this is the difference from the party demagogues in Athens and Florence: after the disaster of Megiddo and later, after the catastrophe prophesied for decades had broken out on Jerusalem, no sign of triumph that his prophecy was right. And also neither now nor before gloomy despair. . . . Indeed undisciplined by priest or estate conventions and unhampered by ascetic or contemplative self-discipline, the glowing passion of the prophets unfolds itself as they look deeply into the abyss of man's heart.'²⁷

But there is one fundamental point which differentiates Weber's secret self-identification with the voices of Jeremiah and Isaiah which we *must* underline. The Jewish prophets were justified in identifying *their* nation as the bearer of the message of the ONE God. For it was His message which excluded other peoples who refused it. And it was the message of the Jewish prophets which was transformed and integrated by Christianity. Thus the ONE God no longer belonged to one people, to one nation. Weber's belief was of a different kind. The nation in which he believed as his ultimate value and norm excluded the other nations; thus, necessarily, Weber's belief lacked universality without which any religious belief becomes impossible.

In the meantime Weber left the hospital administration, not without jotting down extensive reflections on how an administration, first run by dilettantes, changes when it is run by professional administrators. These notes, which Frau Marianne Weber has incorporated into her biography, are a characteristic illustration of the working of Weber's mind. Whatever concrete subject-matter his sociology embraces, he reads and formulates its principles. It is understandable that confident of his own orientation towards the concrete, Weber felt that 'much of what is sailing under the name of sociology is a swindle'. His successors have not always paid attention to this warning.

In summer 1918 we find Weber again in an academic milieu. Vienna University has offered him a professorship. He enjoys the dignified provincialism of the Austrian metropolis: 'Wonderful is this ancient city and her inhabitants.'²⁸ With regret he feels: 'I am a scholar and for health reasons unfortunately no longer a teacher. . . .'²⁹ Meanwhile the Russian Revolution of November 1917 has thrown its shadow on the contemporary political scene. The Austrian military

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authorities invite Max Weber to speak before three hundred officers on *Socialism*.³⁰ Weber is again at his best, speaking without much preparation and with a full grasp of problems to whose clarification he has devoted a lifetime.

We shall discuss this lecture only so far as it helps us to complete the picture of Weber's political sociology. All political parties, he explains, which have a pure socialist character, are to-day democratic parties. Democracy means that no formal inequality of political rights exists concerning the different classes of a people. The old type of democracy is still alive in the cantons Uri, Schwyz, etc. in Switzerland. There all citizens meet together and vote after discussion by raising their hands on everything which concerns them. Yet a closer examination of this neighbourhood-democracy shows that it was aristocratically administered. Certain old family names appear again and again.

Democracy can either be administered, argues Weber further, cheaply by rich people in the form of an honorary administration, or as to-day by well-paid civil servants. Within the modern mass state civil service administration has become the inescapable fate. Consequently, the modern type of democracy is a bureaucratized democracy. This applies *also* to political parties, a fact with which socialism has to reckon. Such a bureaucratized democracy requires a specialized and highly trained personnel without which the modern economic system cannot be run.

Weber proceeds then to prove that the modern concentration of 'the means of production'—the term used in the sense we have already discussed above—is characteristic for the structure of the contemporary economic system and its discipline in army, office, and workshop. It is in Weber's view irrelevant *who* is the master of this huge apparatus. He has always maintained that the *bourgeois entrepreneur* or the industrial, commercial, or agrarian leader (*Betriebsleiter*) is indispensable or at least desirable for a society in which a minimum of freedom is to be guaranteed. It would probably be a very crude interpretation of Weber's political sociology to explain this thesis by his personal class bias. Max Weber, like Karl Marx, thought in social, economic, and cultural world perspectives, an attitude which transcends the personal life and its circumstances. It is perhaps less an economic principle which Weber is defending here than a principle of human creativeness generally. He was horrified to live in a 'brave new world'

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—totally rationalized, what he wanted to save for the future was certainly not the economic *laissez-faire*, but the charismatic principle in economics, politics, and culture. His strong feeling for independence, his personal heroism shape the guiding norms also of his economic philosophy.

A letter of his addressed to Otto Neurath of the 4th of October 1919 is perhaps particularly revealing in this context: 'I agree with you that the free economic system valid up to this time (probably—nothing really certain can yet be said) will not return, except considerably modified for currency and financial reasons: not for other reasons. I am not bemoaning it, if this should happen. But I judge the matter like Eulenburg (memorandum for the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*) and regard the plans for a 'planned economy' as dilettante, objectively absolute irresponsible frivolity which *may* discredit "socialism" for a hundred years and which may throw everything that might be possible now into the abyss of a stupid reaction. This reaction will unfortunately come and there lies the difference between us.'³¹ Again Weber was a true prophet. As regards Germany 'reaction' certainly came. Yet what he failed to see—and *who* saw it in 1919 or 1918?—was, that once the newly created Bolshevik state had overcome its initial difficulties, it might develop the new principles of a planned economy: replacing initiative and economic opportunity by entirely different new social incentives. Service for the community and social security may indeed be compatible with human freedom though the process of combining both is necessarily slow and painful. (The sociologist who even to-day does not see these new facts hardly 'diagnoses' the present and certainly not the future.)

It is interesting to see how, in 1918, Weber estimated the political chances of the Bolshevik régime. He points out the difference prevailing between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks during the early phase of the 'Russian experiment'. The former denied the possibility of changing the present Russian system into a socialist society from above. On the other hand Weber stresses the traditional strength of Russian agrarian communism. 'The German peasant is, at any rate to-day, an individualist and is deeply attached to his hereditary property and to his soil. He is hardly to be taught otherwise. He prefers to make an alliance with the big estate owner instead of with the radical-socialist worker, if he felt himself threatened with regard to his property.'³²

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Thus Weber is not unaware of the social Russian dynamic to which he has already drawn attention, as we remember, in 1906. Neither the Commune nor the Bolshevik régime can dispense with martial law in cases where the foundations of its discipline were threatened—this fact, too, does not escape Weber's attention. But if violence is the State's ultimate law, how can he logically disagree with the new Russian leaders? The *bourgeois* Weber was not prepared to accept the *transitional* character of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

To return to Weber's lecture on *Socialism*, where he discusses the *Communist Manifesto* which he characterizes as 'a scientific achievement of the first order'.³³ Marx's theory of the progressive misery of the working class has now generally been given up. He also stresses the fact that by the very nature of modern capitalism the employees increase faster than the industrial proletariat and he stresses that their interests do not coincide with those of the industrial workers who, for their part, are hierarchically grouped and differentiated. Furthermore the Marxian hope of the final 'great crisis' has disappeared and what is to be expected is not 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', but rather the dictatorship of the civil service—in all its many forms.³⁴ Finally Weber asks: Admittedly the Social Democratic Party and the Trade Unions are the organized bearers of a 'socialist' policy. Will they pursue such a policy in the interest of wages or will they conceive a policy which is compatible with the interest of the State? Again the State, and let there be no mistake: Germany is Weber's ultimate norm.

In autumn 1918 Weber returns to Heidelberg. The war is lost. On September the 27th the German High Command asks the Imperial Government to seek for an armistice. Prince Max of Baden becomes the last Chancellor of the Bismarckian *Reich*. Max Weber writes to Friedrich Naumann (October the 11th): 'If I remain silent for the time being, it is because all outsiders are absolutely uninformed and I am afraid to be contradicted by events and decisions. I admit that we live under the impression of an unrestrained nervousness with regard to everything we hear from Berlin. The nation may have to pay a high price for such an attitude. I hope I am wrong with my assumption. Since disaster has finally overtaken us I have remained cool. I hope you too.'³⁵ Weber now uses the whole of his influence and judgement to achieve the immediate abdication of the Kaiser. To Professor Schulze-Gävernitz he writes on October the 11th: 'Just because I am a sincere

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adherent of monarchical—though parliamentarily limited—institutions and of the German dynasty in particular, the present Kaiser must abdicate in the interest of the *Reich* and the dynasty.’³⁶ A day later he implores Naumann with the same insistence: ‘Is there not one believer in monarchical institutions who could make it clear to the monarch what the hour requires from him? . . . I wish and desire for him in the interest of the nation, dynasty, and history, an end of his régime which corresponds to the dignity of a Kaiser. There *must* be men who can put the necessary stress on this. Whether it is the Prince-Chancellor, I do not know, as his position seems to be uncertain. . . .’³⁷ Again Weber’s advice was not followed; and when it was, it was too late. A prophet is always alone.

On October the 21st he writes to a younger friend and pupil: ‘The war can no longer be won, that is true. But I am not in despair like others. A lost war is not a divine ordeal. Still, fate has been challenged and it has taken its revenge. But that is all. The future will depend on whether the new people will show firm hands in preventing financial bankruptcy (by inflation) and breakdown of order. . . .’³⁸

This seemed indeed the paramount problem arising from Germany’s defeat.

V

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The few letters which have hitherto been made available—not more than eight—suffice to explain Weber’s reaction after the 9th of November 1918. As it has not been the purpose of these pages to write a history of Germany from 1880, but rather to get a glimpse of some essential features of German politics reflected through Max Weber’s political sociology, we can dispense here with a historic account of what is called the German revolution. Weber was invited to join the Heidelberg workers’ and soldiers’ ‘soviet’—a tribute to his moral and political integrity. As in his early years and throughout his life, his objectivity and unacademic directness brought him into immediate contact with the trade union and working-class leaders of Heidelberg.

In a letter to his mother (November 18th) he gives this account of his inner attitude: ‘This breakdown of Ludendorff, the demoralization of the army: a consequence of this permanent whipping up of *Stimmung* by promises which it was impossible to fulfil, this short-sightedness and complete lack of dignity of the Kaiser and giddiness of our dilettante government—all this was painful. It will take a long time for us to swallow this blow to our honour, and the intoxication of the “Revolution” is now only a kind of narcotic for the people, before the great misery begins. Awful are those empty words and depressing those vague hopes, and this totally dilettante play with a “happier future” which never was further from realization. *I am only glad about the humble matter-of-factness (schlichte Sachlichkeit) of the simple trade union people, and also of many soldiers—of our workers’ and soldiers’ “soviet”* to which I belong. They have done their work excellently; this I *must say* (our italics) without question. The nation as a whole is disciplined, but, once this discipline is threatened, then everything, that is clear, is threatened, even the soul of these people.’¹

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Weber's observations are important, because they testify to the fact that, in spite of a world war and in spite of the political docility of the German masses which we have discussed on previous pages of this short study, the German workers (and many soldiers) had profited from the educational work of their *own* organizations. It is in our view more than probable that after the second world war, considering the fact that the National Socialist régime has not lasted much longer than ten years and that at no moment can the unknown corporal's war have appeared as a 'defensive war' of the German nation, Weber's observations may become relevant anew.

Weber is afraid that the communists *may* win the upper hand. He is not certain about this. And if this should happen, then 'the Americans, whether one likes it or not, must be called in to restore order. . . .'² He observes also signs of a Bavarian separatism and maintains, not to our surprise, that the unity of the *Reich* is 'the chief thing. . . .'³

In the *Frankfurter Zeitung* Weber now publishes a series of articles on *Germany's future form of State*,⁴ which continue and partially coincide with his reflections on *Parliament and Government*. Several points of this new work need to be stressed here. Weber makes it abundantly evident that free elections would never result in a Social Democratic majority. 'Without voluntary co-operation of the *bourgeoisie*, the Government will not achieve peace, and a military occupation has, sooner or later, to be expected.'⁵ We have met this central idea of Weber's political sociology before, but now he is developing it into a platform for a Republican democracy. Only the main features of this democratic programme interest us here.

The security under the cloak of the *Obrigkeitsstaat* has finally gone. The *bourgeoisie* must stand on its own feet, as the working class has done before and is doing now. Unfortunately democratic republicanism has come in Germany as a consequence of defeat, not as in Holland, England, America, and France, as a result of 'successful struggles'.⁶ Will the *bourgeoisie* be able to stand the test of its next task, Weber asks. He expresses only a hope. From all we know, he is by no means certain.

In view of the hope for a socialist Germany, prevalent in those November weeks of 1918, Weber details his reasons which make the maintenance of the *bourgeois entrepreneur* imperative. The first reason he gives is a short-term one: 'Only a Government and only an

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economic system of a *bourgeois* structure will be able to receive foreign credits.’⁷ The other reasons for maintaining a *bourgeois* structure of the German economic system arise out of the ‘permanent’ structure of this economic system. He is prepared to admit insurance and mines as ripe for State administration. A partial state socialism might be possible in this economic sphere. Yet those industries which produce finished goods (*Fertigwarenindustrie*) and which are so characteristic of Germany’s commercial-political position cannot be ‘socialized’. With regard to the German agrarian system, apart from the necessary expropriations of the big estate owners, private enterprise (with free co-operatives) is structurally evident. In short: Weber cannot conceive of an economic system which is not mainly based on the autonomous *entrepreneur*. He defines him as bonus wage-earner for organizational purposes (*Prämienlohnarbeiter für Organisationszwecke*). He works on his own responsibility in contrast to the official (*Beamte*) who works only for the pockets of the State. To regard the Stinnes, Rathenau, Krupp, and Borsig, etc. as ‘bonus wage-earners’ is indeed a surprising economic definition. Has Weber forgotten Marx’ doctrine of the basic importance of *who* owns the means of production? Not quite. For he continues: ‘We have indeed no cause to love the masters of heavy industry. It is one of the main tasks of democracy to break the dangerous *political* influence which they had on the old political régime. Yet *economically* their achievements cannot be dispensed with, even less so when as just now the whole economic system has to be re-organized. The *Communist Manifesto* has rightly stressed the *economically*—not politically—*revolutionary* character of the work of the *bourgeois* capitalistic *entrepreneurs*. No trade union, still less no state socialist official, can replace the functions of the capitalists. One must apply them only at the right place; offer them the unavoidable premium of profit, but not allow them to become stronger than democracy. . . .’⁸ But how was Weber to guarantee that German heavy industry would accept the bargain democracy offered? The proclamation of the charismatic principle within the realm of the economic system must ultimately destroy democracy, once it concludes an alliance with the charismatic leader in the realm of politics.

Nor is this all. How could Weber assume that German heavy industry, not to mention the leaders of finance, whose influence he does not discuss, would suddenly form one united *bourgeois* democratic front?

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Did not the history of German ‘liberalism’, particularly after 1878, prove that the German *Grossbürgertum* preferred profits to democracy? If we look at the election statistics (Appendix) of the German *Reichstag* in 1919 and 1920 the answer to our question becomes evident: the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, the new political name of the National Liberal Party, sent in 1919 only nineteen members to the *Reichstag*; in 1920 already sixty-five. The Democratic Party—for which Weber wrote the articles just analysed—had in 1919 seventy-five deputies, in 1920 thirty-nine. The democratic Utopia did not last very long. It could not last very long.

The German *Grossbürgertum* made its alliance with the German Army in spite of its reduction by the Treaty of Versailles, or better, perhaps, just because of it. The German middle class was mortally weakened by inflation. The sham boom of the German economic system which began after the stabilization of the *Reichsmark* in 1924, and which deceived so many economists, not to mention politicians, all over the world, revealed its true character, once the economic world crisis of 1929 began.

Weber put forward similar ideas in a speech he made on the 1st of December 1918, in Frankfurt-on-Main. ‘I am so near to the Social Democratic Party that it is difficult for me to distinguish myself from it. . . .’⁹ Yet he insists on his independence from the *demos*. ‘Revolutions’, he warns his audience, ‘take a fateful course in history, which often easily leads back to the old powers.’¹⁰ Once the socialist belief of the masses has broken, the nation will be ripe for long periods of new authoritarian powers. It needed courage to say such things in those days. Weber was a great orator. Everyone who listened to him testified to this. No wonder, therefore, that after this speech the Democratic Party members of Frankfurt put him spontaneously on the first place of the Hesse-Nassau constituency list. His election for the National Assembly seemed certain. A non-public party conference confirmed the proposal *against* a resolution of the Frankfurt Democratic Party executive. Everything appeared to be finally settled. Yet in party politics one has to pay the price for voting against an executive resolution. A few days before the ultimate list of Democratic candidates was decided upon, the Wetzlar conference of the 19th constituency, deliberating behind closed doors, replaced Weber’s name by a Frankfurt party notability. Thus Weber’s election to the National Assembly was frus-

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trated. It was too late to do anything against this machination. Max Weber fell a victim to the power of a party whose functioning he had so admirably analysed in his sociological *theory*, but whose intricate mechanism he was unable—and unwilling—to master in *practice*.

Still, even without being a member of the National Assembly of Weimar, which was elected on the 19th of January 1919, Weber’s influence on the formulation of the Weimar Constitution¹¹ was considerable.

The Commissar of the People (*Volksbeauftragte*) Ebert had asked Hugo Preuss on the 15th of November 1918 to become head of the reformed Ministry for Home Affairs, particularly with a view to preparing a draft of the new German constitution, which was to be submitted to the National Assembly on the 21st of February 1919. Hugo Preuss, a former professor of Constitutional Law at the *Handelshochschule* in Berlin and author of important studies in the field of constitutional history, arranged for a confidential committee of constitutional experts to meet in Berlin from December the 9th to December the 12th to advise him on the main lines along which the new constitution ought to be drafted.

Amongst these experts was Max Weber. He gives us an intimate impression of the atmosphere permeating this committee when he writes: ‘Yesterday we had our meeting. Preuss is very efficient and he is very intelligent. . . . The situation is ghostlike, because everything may be thrown into the waste-paper basket, indeed this is very probable, for the wheel of events goes over all things and ourselves. . . .’¹² Weber’s gloomy attitude is to be explained by the uncertainty as to how the *Reich’s* conference of all workers’ and soldiers’ soviets, convened for December the 16th, at Berlin, would decide about the question of a Constituent National Assembly. The decision was in favour of a Constituent National Assembly to be elected, as has already been mentioned, on January the 19th.

Within a few days Preuss’s advisory committee concluded its deliberations. ‘So’, Weber writes again in a letter, ‘the Constitution of the *Reich* is—in its principles—finished, on lines *very* similar to my proposals. But we had hot discussions with *very* intelligent people throughout these days, from Monday to Thursday. To-day (the 13th of December 1918) for the first time I had a good long sleep.’¹³ What amazing presumption! A few intelligent, learned, and experienced

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people meet and believe they can decide upon the principles of a constitution which is meant to be the political framework for sixty millions. It is true that Preuss only received drafting instructions, but considering the fact that his first draft was already in print on January the 3rd, it is probably correct to say that never has a constitution been drafted so quickly.

Weber's hand is easily discernible, not only in Preuss's first draft, but also in the final form of the Constitution (the 11th of August 1919). Three of his suggestions were of fundamental importance for the Constitution of Weimar. First he asked 'for as much unity as possible within a federal constitution'.¹⁴ Further comment here is perhaps unnecessary as this suggestion is in complete accordance with his previously discussed political ideas. Second: Weber succeeded in getting his suggestion for *enquête* committees accepted.¹⁵ This institution, however, adopted from the British parliamentary committee system, works only within a political framework where the parties agree on the fundamental conception of the society in which they have their roots. Once this fundamental agreement is violated, or, as in the case of the Germany of 1919 non-existent, even the best constitutional devices are doomed to failure. Weber, his colleagues, and the men of the final *Verfassungsausschuss* in Weimar, presupposed a stability and harmony within German society which was never realized and which, if we are not mistaken, will not be realized in the future, because German society has already irrevocably entered the post-*bourgeois* phase of its history.

Weber's third proposal was even more important. Article 41 of the Constitution is mainly due to Weber's influence: 'The President of the *Reich* is elected by the whole German people.' Prince Max von Baden greets this law in his emphatic manner as Weber's political 'great deed' (*Grosstat*).¹⁶ Here Weber's political sociology comes into its own. The charismatic political leader must be elected by *Volkswahl*, by the people as a whole, and not by parliament. He, the President of the *Reich*, must become the centre and substance of a political system of which necessarily the political parties are the main instruments. Weber rejects, not without a nationalistic bias, as it seems to us, the French Presidential system, the system of the Third Republic; he believes that the President of France, who is elected by Parliament and Senate which together constitute the National Assembly, becomes the

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play ball of the political parties. Yet a closer study of French constitutional history shows that the constitution makers of the Third Republic favoured the ‘ parliamentary ’ election of the President bearing in mind the eventful history of the plebiscitarian principle in France. Moreover, the French Senate had always a socio-political structure quite different from the French parliament. By its inclusion into the French National Assembly a considerable safeguard against a purely ‘ parliamentary ’ President was established.

Already in *The future state-form of Germany*¹⁷ Weber pleaded for a plebiscitarian President, differentiating his own proposal from the American Presidential system by a passionate attack on the American ‘ spoils ’ system. Weber also regards the American political parties as pure platform parties (he uses to characterize their political attitude the abusive term *gesinnungslos*) and contrasts them with the German *Weltanschauung* parties of which at least four seem to him structurally inherent within German society: a conservative, a democratic (liberal), a socialist, and a Catholic party. It is superfluous to discuss in this context whether Weber’s appreciation of the American Presidential system in 1918 was correct or not,¹⁸ as this book is not a comparative constitutional treatise.

The National Assembly elected Friedrich Ebert as President of the Republic on the 11th of February 1919. Weber would have preferred his direct election by the people as a whole. After the election he published an article, *The Reich’s President*, in which he again stressed the arguments in support of this view.¹⁹ For the purpose of our study one of these arguments is of particular relevance. He writes: ‘ Only the election by the people of a *Reich’s* President provides the opportunity to achieve selection of political leadership and may consequently lead to a revitalization of political parties which will overcome the antiquated system run by notabilities hitherto practised. Were this system to remain, a political and progressive democracy would come to grief very shortly. The elections (of January 1919) showed that the old professional politicians have managed everywhere to keep out those men, against the wish of the masses of the electorate, who had their confidence. . . .²⁰ Weber has profited from his recent experience with the Wetzlar constituency party conference.

But has the plebiscitary *Reich’s* President really invigorated the German party system? Not at all. The political parties organized the

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Presidential elections in the same way as they fought the elections for the *Reichstag* though, it is true, they had to take into account a politically more fluid electorate. Weber’s conception that the highest office of the *Reich*, once it was open to the political struggle, might provide an aim for young and untried ‘charismatic leadership’ was romanticism *pur sang*. And a dangerous romanticism at that for the *Reich’s* President had a terrible weapon at his disposal: the famous Article 48 paragraph 2, of the Weimar Constitution ²¹ by the application of which the Constitution of Weimar was undermined and finally destroyed. Towards the end of the Weimar Republic nothing remained of the Weimar Constitution except Article 48.

Weber’s glorification of the plebiscitarian principle here (and in his political sociology generally) exerted a considerable influence on other German constitutional lawyers, e.g. Koellreuter and Carl Schmitt. The latter brought the plebiscitarian principle into a system by virtue of which the President of the *Reich* became the ‘guardian of the Constitution’. Thus the wolf was made to look after the sheep.

Moreover, another observation may perhaps be permitted. The Presidential system of the plebiscitary type can only work within a society in which, in principle, *law*, not *will* prevails. In the sphere of the State the weakest point of the German political structure has always been the lack of a living state law tradition. No constitutional lawyer, however ‘intelligent’ he may be, can make up for this lack of an atmosphere of lawfulness, an atmosphere which in England and the U.S.A. has taken centuries to develop. It is in the realm of law *versus* will that we meet the fundamental difference between the British-American and the German political structure. ²²

There is a further letter of Weber’s of which the main parts must be given here, before we proceed with an account of Weber’s last political action. He wrote this letter while he was writing his articles on *Germany’s future form of state* in Frankfurt, addressed to Professor Crusius; the letter runs as follows: ‘In the meantime I attempt the discussion of more *formal* questions in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. As long as such massive technical and economic problems occupy your mind as is now the case—what matters is the bare existence of the masses—it is hardly possible to think about cultural problems. With regard to the latter the first task is the restoration of that sober moral “decency” which,—seen by and large—we had, and which we

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have lost in the war—our greatest loss. There are very massive questions of education. Means: the American Youth Clubs; beginnings of which are to be found in the Free German Youth Movement. I do not know of other means because authority—towards which I have no prejudice—is now breaking down completely—except in the form of the *Church*. Refusal of spiritual narcotics of all kinds, from mysticism to “expressionism”. “Objectivity” (*Sachlichkeit*) as sole means to achieve pureness and the feeling of shame against the disgusting exhibitionism of those who are morally broken down—only this will provide us with a firm attitude. . . .’²³ Weber compares the Germany of 1918 with Athens after Aigospotamoi and Chaironaia, or with France after 1871. ‘We start again anew, as after 1648 and 1807. That is the simple fact. Only that to-day one lives and works more quickly and with more initiative. Not we, but the next generation will see the beginning of a new rise. Naturally the self-discipline of sincerity forces us to admit: the role of Germany in world politics is finished; the Anglo-Saxon world domination is a fact—“*ah c’est nous qui l’avons faite*” as Thiers said to Bismarck with regard to our unity. This is very unpleasant, but we have warded off much worse: the *Russian knout* (our italics). This is *our* glory.’²⁴ Weber is at least consistent. Russia, as in 1894, is still the main enemy.

‘America’s world domination was as unavoidable as that of Rome after the Punic War. *It is to be hoped that it will not be shared with Russia. This is to me the aim of our future world policy, for the Russian danger is only banished for the present, not for ever* (our italics). For the moment the hysterical and disgusting hatred of the French is the main danger. . . .’²⁵ Weber does not seem to realize that France had justifiable reasons for such a hatred: she had suffered most physically, her manhood was decimated. Weber is blind to these facts. For him only Germany matters. *Raison*, English ‘conventions’ and the Russian ‘*knout*’ can never be allowed to perpetuate their victory over the German nation. Here too, Weber’s political sociology is consistent.

‘Honesty is the first thing. We have shown to the world, 110 years ago, that we—and we *alone*—were able to be one of the great cultural peoples under foreign domination. This we shall demonstrate again! Then history, which has already given us—and us *alone*—a second youth—will give us also a third one. I have no doubt about it, nor you—*quand-même!* *What one says now publicly, is, of course, always only*

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“*rebus sic stantibus*”, not “*pour jamais*”. *Toujours y penser*. . . .²² Weber was at least honest. Yet in spite of this personal honesty it was a dangerous patriotism or, worse, chauvinism, the ‘blood and iron’ nationalism of the Bismarckian age. Weber never realized that the reasons for the victory of the Allies over Germany lay deeper than in an ultimately greater economic or human potential. A philosophy of life had maintained itself, as it will maintain itself again in the second world war.

Weber had only a glimpse of the underlying values of the West—in spite of the *Protestant Ethic*. He failed to understand that these values inherent in and interwoven with the Western world were not yet destroyed by the impact of rationalization and the steel age. Nor were they weakened in 1940 when the German bombers attempted to break British resistance. Under secularized forms, the old spirit of Cromwell’s soldiers was awakened, and sustained the British citizen during the horrors of destruction.

‘*Toujours y penser*. . . .’ Not for a moment did Weber grasp that the era of nationalism died on the battlefields of the first world war. He thought of revenge and of Germany’s new role in world politics. He had nothing in common with men like Maynard Keynes, now Lord Keynes, or General Smuts, who as true *universal* prophets, had learnt the lesson of the first world war. Surely they, and a few others, were lone prophets, and their words were of no avail. We needed another world war to rise to their greatness.

And yet, dangerous and aggressive as Weber’s nationalism was, he stands head and shoulders above those Germans who now write and teach in America and England that everything German is rotten and disgusting, forgetting and carefully hiding what they said and did from 1918 onwards. With these contemptible *agents-provocateurs* who behave as if they had always been in the pay of the Allied Intelligence Services, Max Weber has nothing in common. He had at least the courage to stand by his people in the hour of defeat. His political philosophy was morally wrong and infectious, but he stood to his ‘values’—fearless and upright.

After some initial hesitation Weber accepted an invitation from the Republican Government to accompany the German peace delegation to Versailles as adviser on the question of the German war-guilt. From his general attitude after Germany’s defeat, which we have already

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discussed, it is evident that Weber pleaded for the rejection of the peace terms. He would have preferred Allied occupation. He held the view that the economic conditions of the peace treaty were unrealizable. Nor could he accept the thesis of Germany's sole war-guilt. With regard to the latter problem it may suffice to draw attention to an article of Weber's—again published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on the 17th of January 1919.²⁷ Here he maintains that, for political and general cultural reasons, he had always been, before and during the war, for an honest understanding with England; such an understanding would have prevented a war.²⁸ This is certainly true, and not many German patriots have in this respect such a clear conscience as Weber. Whether on the principle of Weber's power-political philosophy such an understanding could have been possible or permanent is, of course, a different question. ‘For this war’, Weber writes unmistakably, ‘there was only one power, which under all circumstances willed the war for war's sake and according to its political aims: Russia, i.e. Tsarism as a system. . . .’²⁹

Weber had not changed his views when at Versailles behind barbed wire he prepared, together with Professor Delbrueck, Count Montgelas, Professor Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, the German memorandum on the ‘*examination of the question of war guilt*’. ‘Alone,’ we read in it, ‘as a defensive war against Tsarism, the German people accepted the struggle in 1914—unanimously and resolutely.’³⁰ Weber's hand is easy to recognize. ‘I am afraid’, he writes in a letter of June 1919, ‘that with this peace we only stand at the beginning of the misery. For it is absolutely impossible to fulfil it. . . .’³¹ Yet Weber's rejection of the peace treaty was not nourished by the conception of the intrinsic unity of a new world society. It is instructive to confront Weber with Lord Keynes, who wrote in his *Economic Consequences of the Peace*³² in 1919: ‘My purpose in this book is to show that the Carthaginian peace is not practically right or possible. . . . The clock cannot be set back. You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains in the European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and your “guarantees” but your institutions and the existing order of your society.’ Lord Keynes also clearly perceived that the peace treaty was not conceived in adequate economic terms: ‘To what a different future Europe might have looked forward, if either

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Mr. Lloyd George or Mr. Wilson had apprehended that the most serious of the problems which claimed their attention were not political or territorial, but financial and economic, and that the perils of the future lay not in frontiers and in sovereignties, but in food, coal, and transport.’ In fact, politics cannot be separated from economics. It is to be hoped that the peace-makers after the second world war will have learnt this lesson.³³

The peace treaty was signed by the representatives of Germany at Versailles on June the 28th. The National Assembly resolved its ratification on the 16th of July 1919. The politician Max Weber fell silent: *toujours y penser*.

Publicly he kept this silence. He resumed his academic work. Yet within the circle of his intimate friends he was frank enough. Asked by a trusted pupil what his political plans were, he answered: ‘I have no political plans except to concentrate all my intellectual strength on the one problem, how to get once more for Germany a great general staff.’³⁴ Indeed: *toujours y penser*. Max Weber was, unfortunately, not the only one who concentrated his thoughts on this point, with what dire results we now know.

We have confronted Max Weber with General Smuts and Lord Keynes. There is also a German voice which should be heard on the concluding pages of this chapter. It is, again, the pure and deep voice of Rainer Maria Rilke, who, another lonely European prophet, writes to a despairing friend from Switzerland on the 2nd of February 1923: ‘For me, as I see things and live through them, perforce in my own way, there is no doubt, that it is Germany who is arresting the progress of the world, because she does not know herself. The many-sided and broad nature of my make-up allows me the necessary perspective to see this. Germany in 1918, in the hour of collapse, could have shaken and put to shame the whole world by an act of honesty and repentance; by a visible and determined renunciation of her spurious prosperity—in short, by a humility which would have been of the very essence of her character and dignity and which would have forestalled all the humiliations that could be imposed on her from without. It was then—so I hoped for a time—that this long-lost trait of humility, so inherent in the charm of Dürer’s drawings, would once again have appeared in the strangely one-sided and docile countenance of Germany. Perhaps there were a few who felt this, who desired and believed in such a conver-

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sion—but now we begin to perceive that it never took place, and we are already reaping the harvest. Something was lacking which would have put everything in the right perspective; Germany neglected to re-establish her purest and highest standards, which were based on the most ancient traditions. Hers was not a complete conversion and change of heart; she did not acquire that dignity which springs from the deepest humility; she was concerned only with salvation in a superficial, hasty, distrustful, and grasping sense; she wanted to do something and to get away with it, rather than to follow her innermost call, which was to endure, to overcome, and to be ready for her own miracle. She wanted to persist, and not to alter. And so we feel now that something is lacking. There is no date to point to. A 'rung is missing in the ladder, and hence the indescribable apprehension, the anxiety, the "presentiment of a sudden and violent fall". . . . What can we do? Let us, each one of us, remain on our own little island of life—still peaceful, still safe—going about our own business, alone with our feelings and our suffering. . . .'³⁵

Is it possible to hope that we have listened to the voice of the future Germany? Or will there be other Max Webers to teach the German youth and their uncritical teachers a new Machiavellism of the steel age? The time to answer these questions is not yet. . . .

VI

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Weber succeeded Brentano as professor of economics at Munich University. During the summer term of 1919 he gave only one lecture a week; during the winter term of 1919–20 he put his whole energy into his academic work. It was to be his last effort. The end was near. Weber was a creative personality, not a typical German professor. His last works show the perfection which is the hall-mark of all great creations of the human mind.

His lectures were devoted to a sociological subject, a *General Economic History*, which has been published posthumously by friends and pupils in co-operation with his wife. Weber himself regarded this work as an improvisation which his students, longing for a synthetic view of the growth and structures of universal history, had forced on him. The world was out of joint. States and societies had broken down, new states and new societies were rising. Was not a general economic history taught by a man of Weber's formidable and unique knowledge a key for those young men who had just returned from a world war and who were eager to relate their own disordered lives to the great stream of historic development of world civilization? It was the time when books like Spengler's *Decline of the West* were read even by schoolboys. Even they, like the writer of this book, were longing for synthetic answers, for guiding and norm-giving principles at a time when all human principles seemed to be questionable.

Weber understood this demand. He condensed the economic structures of world history in an account of its socio-economic development ranging from the early forms of agrarian communities to the beginning of capitalism. He also continued his studies on *Economics and Society* and felt himself 'that he had reached the highest stage of his "terminological penetration"'.¹ Weber was not given the chance to complete his main work, but even in its unfinished form, of which the

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reader ought always to be aware, it ranks amongst the very few classical works of sociology in spite of the shortcomings which these pages have attempted to indicate.

It was easy to become a prophet in the Germany of 1919. The circle around Stefan George gathered strength, Rudolf Steiner's anthroposophy showed signs of becoming a mass movement, Freudism pretended to have discovered a cure for the emotional and unconscious elements of human nature, even the unknown corporal of the first world war began to form a sect of blind and uprooted followers.

Max Weber remained steadfast. He maintained, perhaps he even over-emphasized, the significance and ultimate meaning of European rationalism. In two public lectures he summed up the lessons of his life. These two yellow-covered pamphlets have accompanied our youthful wanderings through the jungle of our intellectual and moral embarrassment: *Science as a Calling*² and *Politics as a Calling* (*Wissenschaft als Beruf* and *Politik als Beruf*).³ We enter into an analysis of these two addresses only so far as they help us to complete and to round off our interpretation of Weber's political sociology.

All science is to-day of a specialized character. Certainly intuition and chance play an important role also with regard to scientific work, but without a scientific technique science, all science—whether mathematics, economics, or cultural sciences like history—, must remain of a dilettantic character. Moreover, all scientific work is bound up with *material* progress. Contrary to the work of art—Homer's creations as Marx has already seen are permanently valid—the scientific work gets out of date, new methods are developed, new scientific questions are asked. Science in this sense is only a link in the general process of intellectualization or rationalization of the world. We ask scientific questions to calculate the means whereby we aim at *dominating* the world. Since Socrates discovered the general concept (*Begriff*) and the Renaissance age developed the scientific experiment, the progress of science has never come to a standstill—and it never will.

But how far, Weber asks now, does science help us to answer the perhaps more burning question: What shall we do now and in the future? Is science applicable to help us to solve our practical political decisions? Is the academic teacher allowed to propagate his own political views, *if* he has his own political views? No. He is not. Weber never forgot his youthful impression when he sat at the feet of

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Treitschke almost forty years before. To speak at a political meeting as a Democrat and to teach academically the function and meaning of a democratic system are two entirely different things. The professor who teaches politics—and politics is teachable—is only allowed to calculate the *means*, if certain political *ends* are to be achieved. Thus it is the task of science to *clarify* our mind, provided we ourselves are clear.

To come to personal decisions in politics or to come to *final* decisions in life is a decision between ultimately antagonistic attitudes in valuations. Science and religious revelation are *incompatible*. An acceptance of religious revelation means, according to Weber, 'sacrifice of the intellect' or the escape in Tertullian's *Credo, quia absurdum*.⁴ Weber does not see that the roots of science and religion, not necessarily Churches, are basically the same. His science is autonomous and of a Promethean character. But no Prometheus has challenged God unpunished.

The substance of Weber's world consists of an unbridgeable tension between values and science. He has misinterpreted Socrates and Plato for whom values and science were *inseparably* bound together. It is the same fundamental conflict which determined the foundations of his political sociology, namely that state forms are pure techniques.

Yet his interpretation of science was not a weak relativism, though some of his followers have drawn such a conclusion, and even suggested that the intelligentsia was the sole bearer of a social synthesis or the teachers of 'social awareness'.⁵ Nothing is further from Weber's position. He, at least, had the courage to stand for his own valuations, though they were ultimately wrong.

So far we have discussed Weber's address on *Science as a Calling*. The lecture on *Politics as a Calling* must be read and studied in conjunction with it. Here, too, we only refer to those of Weber's ideas which implement the general conception of his political sociology.

We already know Weber's definition of the State as 'the monopoly for legitimate physical violence'.⁶ This, as he now makes clear, applies also to the relationship *between* State and State; for here, too, politics 'is the drive for power or for the influence of the division of power'.⁷ The modern State is such a State which has united all the objective means of production in the hands of its functionaries. All this we have already met before, though Weber's art of formulating general socio-

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logical concepts seems now to have reached a perfection which to some extent surpasses all his previous writings.

Politics are to-day bureaucratized (*Betrieb*) even if they are run in the form of the British parliamentary system or in the form of the American, Presidential system. Yet within both these systems two different kinds of officials are discernible: the civil servant and the *political* civil servant (*Fachbeamte* and *politische Beamte*). Before the modern era of universal rationalization began, England, in contrast to France and Prussia, did not undergo the process of bureaucratization because the 'gentry' occupied all offices of local administration ('self-government'). Now the true civil servant must be non-political. It is characteristic of the specific civil service honour to fulfil scrupulously and obediently even a wrong command of the person who is set over him. Without this 'self-sacrifice' the modern State machine would break down completely. Quite different is the attitude of the politician, and in particular, that of the political leader. He must fight; passion, party bias (*Parteinahme*) are the elements in which he lives.

Weber contrasts now the old type of party organizations based on notabilities with the modern forms of party organization. 'They are the children of democracy, of universal franchise, the necessity of mass appeal and mass organization, the development of the highest unity of leadership and strongest discipline.'⁸ *Formally* complete democratization seems to be achieved. In point of fact all political power is in the hands of those who continually do the work within the party machine. 'Leader is the one whom the machine follows, even beyond the head of parliament. The creation of such machines . . . means the beginning of plebiscitarian democracy.'⁹ It seems to us that Weber, clearly under the influence of Ostrogorski, to whose studies he refers, over-emphasizes the plebiscitarian tendency of modern party organizations. Yet it may be better to overstress the plebiscitarian danger (in Weber's view, as we know, it is not a danger) than not to see it at all.

For Weber the alternative is clear: leadership-democracy with party machine or a democracy without leaders, i.e. domination by 'professional politicians' *without* a calling, without those inner charismatic qualities which make a political leader. The alternative is logical, but nevertheless unreal. Nobody will deny the dangers of bureaucratized party machines. Nobody can deny the importance of the plebiscitarian principle within the modern mass-state. Alexis de Tocqueville's¹⁰

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political philosophy was meant as a counter-recipe against the plebscitarian dangers. Still, neither in America nor in England have the traditional roots of democracy disappeared, nor is there a likelihood that they will disappear in the future since they have stood the test of the 'charismatic leadership' of the unknown corporal of the first world war. There is still an independent judiciary, there is still freedom of speech and press, and there are millions of common people who—in spite of picture theatres and radio—think and act for themselves and will choose their leaders, possibly against those few who hold the reins of the party executives. It is wholesome to have read and to read Ostrogorski, but it is important to bear in mind that the *traditional* democracies whose decline he so firmly prophesied in 1902 are still alive.

Weber turns now to the ethic of politics. According to him the professional politician enjoys power. What must his human qualities be, if he attempts to reconcile power with responsibility (*Verantwortung*)? Passion, responsibility, judgement (*Augenmass*), thus Weber defines the three qualities which determine thought and action of the politician. Vanity is his hourly deadly enemy. Politics, maintains Weber, without 'belief' (*Glauben*) is impossible. Whether the politician believes in national, supra-national, ethical, or religious aims, he must believe in something. Even with this admission the ethic of politics is not determined; e.g. it is not a sign of dignity, chivalry (*Ritterlichkeit*), nor is it objectivity to ask now, after the war, who was guilty, 'because it was the structure of society which produced the war'.¹¹ We must say to the enemy in a manly and austere attitude—Weber is addressing German students: 'We lost the war—you won it. That is finished: now let us see what consequences are to be drawn from it according to the objective interests which were involved, and—this is the main thing—in view of the *future*, which above all burdens the victorious.'¹² In this way Weber demonstrates dignity, chivalry, and objectivity.

All this is preliminary. What is the real relationship between ethics and politics? Have they anything to do at all with each other? And if not, is there *one* ethic which also dominates politics? This question leads Weber back to his definition that the specific means of politics is power, backed by violence. Is the absolute ethic of the Sermon of the Mount valid in the realm of politics? Definitely not. It is for the politician 'lack of dignity' to 'offer the other cheek', while the saint may

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live according to this norm. The absolute ethic does not ask to what consequences the following of its norms may lead.

Here, Weber continues his argument, we have reached the decisive point. There are two fundamentally different ethical conceptions: the ethics of sentiment (*Gesinnungsethik*) and the ethics of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*). About the former, the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, no further comment seems necessary; with regard to the latter Weber adds: one must be responsible for all predictable consequences of one's action. We are not concerned here with the theological problem whether Weber's interpretation of the Christian ethic is adequate. We doubt it. The problem is for Weber solely: can means justify ends—a problem which, in his view, the absolute ethic is unable to solve. The believer in an absolute ethic cannot stand up to the ethical irrationality of the world.¹³ 'The early Christians knew very well that the world is full of devils, and that he who enters politics, e.g. the realm where alone power and violence as means are valid, concludes a pact with devilish powers, and that from good may only come good, from evil only evil is *not* true; but very often the contrary. Who does not see this is politically a child.'¹⁴ Weber defends his new Machiavellism¹⁵ by a very significant reference to Protestantism. He writes: 'Protestantism defined the State as a means of violence, as an absolute divine institution, and the legitimate *Obrigkeitsstaat* in particular. Luther took from the individual the ethical responsibility for war and referred it to the state authority; to obey this authority in all matters outside religious belief, could not entail guilt.'¹⁶ Of course, Weber does not mean to say that this form of Protestantism corresponded to his own religious belief. With regard to the latter he has expressed himself in his curiously free and easy manner in a letter written more than ten years earlier: 'I am religiously absolutely unmusical, and I have neither need nor capacity to build monuments of a religious character within me. But, after exact self-examination, I am neither anti-religious nor irreligious.'¹⁷ But this is quite irrelevant here; what is relevant is that it was Luther's influence on the structure of German politics which also shaped Max Weber's mind.

What differentiated Weber from Lutheranism and what ultimately determined the tragic character of his moral stature is the fact that he was aware of the eternal conflict between power and justice. '*The genius or demon of politics*', he writes, '*lives with the God of love, and*

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*also with the God of the Church in an inner tension which at any time may break out into an unsolvable conflict. . . .*¹⁸ (Our italics.) Weber's moral honesty almost reaches the point of self-destruction. He finds comfort in Machiavelli, who in his *Florentine History* praised those citizens who sacrificed their souls for the greatness of their city.

And yet, an absolute ethic *and* an ethic of responsibility are not totally antagonistic. They are complements which together make up the man who is ripe for 'politics as a calling'.¹⁹ Weber is aware of a deadly conflict, but without belief in ONE God his solution must remain vague and dangerous.

Weber leaves his audience with a last warning: 'Politics is like digging slowly and steadily into hard ground, with both enthusiasm and judgement. History proves that you will not be able to achieve what is possible if you do not strive sometimes after the impossible. The man who undertakes this must be a leader and not only a leader but also—using the word in its literal sense—a hero. Those who do not possess either of these qualities must arm themselves with that stoutness of heart which gives hope even to desperate men, or they will not even be able to achieve what is already possible. Only he who is certain that he will not despair when the world, as he sees it, is too stupid and too mean to appreciate what he is offering it, and who is prepared to persevere, only he should take up politics as a profession.'²⁰

Weber has completed his task. As a consequence of overwork, overstrain, undernourishment, he fell a victim to that enigmatic illness *Grippe*, which in the Germany of 1920 took so many valuable lives. He died in Heidelberg on the 14th of June 1920. His last words were: 'The Truth is the Truth' (*Das Wahre ist die Wahrheit*). Has his Heraclitean soul finally discovered the Eleatic wisdom? We do not know. But he found at last rest and peace.

VII

Conclusions

A few concluding considerations may now perhaps be justified. We have chosen the *bourgeois* Max Weber as a mirror of Germany's socio-economic and cultural developments since the early 'eighties of the last century, not because he was a typical *bourgeois*, but because his analytic and reflective powers were such that in him one could focus the complicated and diversified threads which form 'the German problem'. Whether we have achieved our aim, is for the reader to judge.

We have seen how Weber, in spite of his insight into the fatal consequences of the Bismarckian régime on the German political structure, was never able to free himself from the 'blood and iron' pattern. Nor were the constitutional devices to provide the German people with a 'charismatic leader' ultimately more than a cloak to produce by a political 'technique' what in the case of Bismarck 'fate' had given to the Germans. Enough has been said in the preceding pages on Weber's power-political motive and on the Protestant character of his and his nation's political philosophy. Apart from the power-political *leitmotiv* Weber was guided by a *formalized* conception of Kant's categorical imperative. While Kant at least taught that 'the maxim of your will ought to be such that it might form the principle of a general world order'—was not Kant the author of a study on *perpetual peace*?—Weber and with him, the German *bourgeoisie*, attenuated this Kantian principle into a purely formal conception of *duty*. Yet this formalized ethic was without any content, and just because it was *formalized*, it provided men with no guidance.

Weber had not a philosophic mind, and it is perhaps tragic that this great spokesman of the German *bourgeoisie* was satisfied to rely on

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Rickert's 'philosophy of values',¹ to provide him with a philosophic foundation for his political sociology. The effort to overcome the empty character of Rickert's philosophy of values, which had been undertaken by Max Scheler, exerted no influence on Weber's mind, though he might have found in Scheler's philosophical ethic a firmly founded hierarchy of values, amongst which 'the nation' was by no means the highest.

Nor is this all. In spite of the universal tendency of Weber's sociology, his outlook was basically European, or rather German-European. As he never reflected on the wealth of value-patterns which underlie the American-Anglo and French civilizations—here he could have learnt much from his friend Ernst Troeltsch²—he also never realized the impact of European 'rationalism' on the Eastern cultures, though it is highly probable—as the example of China proves—that the Eastern civilizations may be able to synthesize this European rationalism with their own traditions and the centre of world culture may, as a consequence, shift from West to East. Russia, China, and India are only at the beginning of the new role which they may play in the history of world culture. A sociology which is really universal must be aware of these potential trends.

We remember how Weber considered it as Germany's 'glory' to have saved Europe from the Russian 'knout'. He did not see, and perhaps he could not see, the new Russia.

There are still people who do not see it even to-day. It is beyond the scope of these short concluding remarks to discuss the possible impact of the new Russia on world affairs generally. We only want to indicate the potential influence of Russia on the future political structure of Germany, and thereby on Europe. We have seen in the course of this study the continuing decline of the German *bourgeoisie*. We have indicated the growth of the 'new middle classes' until they were absorbed by fascism.

The impact of the second world war has destroyed the economic foundations on which the existence of both these classes was based. It is inconceivable that there is any possibility of their being revived after the war. The German economic system is to an infinitely greater degree, if not totally, put on a war footing, as compared with 1919. Even then the transition from war to 'peace' would hardly have been possible without considerable foreign credits. If we can assume that

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after the second world war the lesson, that politics cannot be separated from economics, has been learnt, it is not likely that the German economic system will be rebuilt in the interests of the German *Grossbürgertum*, the *Junkers* or *bourgeoisie* already moribund in 1932. The German *Grossbürgertum* will scarcely be offered new foreign credits to prepare for another world war, and the German peasantry which cannot form the basis of an industrial society is undoubtedly an economic minority.

There remain the German workers. They, together with the, now, and perhaps finally, disillusioned masses of the *Mittelschichten*, will strive to build a new political structure for Germany in which planned production for community consumption may be regarded as the main principle. In this respect, too, the Russian example will have a powerful influence in providing technical and ideological patterns. Yet it seems also probable that these patterns may not be exclusive. For we have also learnt from our interpretation of Weber's political sociology that the 'confessional' element in Germany is strong and persevering. In our view a Christian, mainly Catholic, element in this new political structure of Germany will be very likely. We therefore may look forward to a *Christian Collectivism*. We say 'mainly Catholic', because only the Catholic Church possesses by its *Kaplanokratie* an organizational system which, according to all evidence, even under a fascist system cannot be destroyed. Nor is this all. The Christian Churches have become the refuge for many Germans who were unable to accept the National Socialist policy of a totalitarian Nihilism.

Certainly there are all too many Germans who are prepared to agree with the theory and practice of the power-political State, but who would reject the Nazi methods: particularly their employment with regard to their own people. We are far from saying that this 'type' is preferable to the National Socialist. While the former is subtle, the latter allows *at least no deception*. (This attitude which was typified by Max Weber presents probably the fundamental difficulty for an understanding of the German national character.)

Yet, in spite of this we feel justified in speaking of a *Christian Collectivism*, because the traditional Christian ideologies are strong and may even be strengthened by an urge for repentance. If our prognosis should prove correct, and we suggest it, with all diffidence, fully realizing the opposite possibilities, we might be able to direct German

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energy from war-making towards a simple heroism of fulfilling the humble task of the day.

While these lines are being written, the Archbishop of York is visiting the Russian Patriarch in Moscow. It seems that England and Soviet Russia are aware of the great potentialities which spiritual organizations may be able to direct. The Catholic Church with her organizational traditions cannot be blind to such potentialities. Moreover, the Utopia of German power-politics is for ever finished. Against this danger the world is relatively easy to unite. But this *negative* unity must be supported by a resurrection of German repentance, a repentance born out of suffering. (General Smuts has recently drawn our attention to such a hope and he—great statesman and writer as he is—may certainly be regarded a better judge of the human soul than the author of an elegant book on Talleyrand.)

But apart from these tentative reflections concerning the future structure of German politics, the German economic and social potential will not necessitate a division of Europe into spheres of interest. Nothing else would make a third world-war more certain, because the question would at once arise: which nation commands the greater economic and social potential? It would seem that neither the Moscow Conference of the British, American, and Soviet Foreign Ministers, nor the Teheran Conference have made our diffident suggestions superfluous.

Only a mutual understanding based on common functional³ tasks between France, England, the U.S.A., and Russia with regard to the 'German problem'⁴ in the sole interest, not of power-politics, but of the common man everywhere, can help to rebuild the structure of German politics. In this sense we all are common men, including our presumptuous intelligentsia and self-appointed '*élites*'.

If this book should be found to have contributed towards this task even to the minutest degree, it will have been worth while.

Appendix I

MAX WEBER ON BUREAUCRATIZATION IN 1909

I hope I shall be excused if, after this morning's discussions, which have been devoted mainly to very interesting specific problems, I return to those general aspects which have emerged in the debates, beginning with what our esteemed master, Privy Councillor Wagner, said this morning. One of his pronouncements I heard with astonishment; namely, that the railway profits in Prussia go to benefit the poorer classes. To my knowledge, it is mainly from the pockets of the poorer classes that they are drawn (laughter) and they are used first and foremost to pay the estate owners' taxes (Cries of 'Hear, hear!' and opposition). Perhaps this point of view, which I deliberately stress, is as one-sided as Privy Councillor Wagner's, but it was impossible to allow his words to pass unchallenged. (Cry of 'He didn't say that!') (Privy Councillor Wagner: 'I said that the great national works would benefit.') But you said more than that!

Then I must refer to one or two of my brother's expositions. Although our opinions differ in many things, I can only say that on this point we are in complete agreement. My brother is certainly as convinced as Privy Councillor Wagner and myself that the forward progress of bureaucratic mechanization is irresistible. (Hear, hear!) Indeed, there is nothing, no machinery in the world, which works so precisely as does this human machine—nor so cheaply! It is, for instance, nonsense to say that self-government must be juster because it is administered from the high places. When a purely technical and faultless administration, a precise and objective solution of concrete problems is taken as the highest and only goal, then on this basis one can only say: away with everything but an official hierarchy which does these things as objectively, precisely, and 'soullessly' as any machine. (Cries of 'Nonsense'.)

The technical superiority of the bureaucratic mechanism stands

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unshaken, as does the technical superiority of the machine over the handworker. But at the time when the *Verein für Socialpolitik* was founded, it was Privy Councillor Wagner's generation—negligible in numbers just as we dissentients are to-day negligible compared with them—that cried out for other than such purely technical measures. They, gentlemen, had to fight against the storm of applause for the purely technical results of industrial mechanization as the Manchester theory then represented them. It seems to me that to-day they are in danger of giving just such applause to mechanization in the sphere of government and politics. For what else, after all, have we heard from them? Imagine the consequences of that comprehensive bureaucratization and rationalization which already to-day we see approaching. Already now, throughout private enterprise in wholesale manufacture, as well as in all other economic enterprises run on modern lines, *Rechenhaftigkeit*, rational calculation, is manifest at every stage. By it, the performance of each individual worker is mathematically measured, each man becomes a little cog in the machine and, aware of this, his one preoccupation is whether he can become a bigger cog. Take as an extreme example the authoritative power of the State or of the municipality in a monarchical constitution: it is strikingly reminiscent of the ancient kingdom of Egypt, in which the system of the 'minor official' prevailed at all levels. To this day there has never existed a bureaucracy which could compare with that of Egypt. This is known to everyone who knows the social history of ancient times; and it is equally apparent that to-day we are proceeding towards an evolution which resembles that system in every detail, except that it is built on other foundations, on technically more perfect, more rationalized, and therefore much more mechanized foundations. The problem which besets us now is not: how can this evolution be changed?—for that is impossible, but: what will come of it? We willingly admit that there are honourable and talented men at the top of our administration; that in spite of all the exceptions such people have opportunities to rise in the official hierarchy, just as the universities, for instance, claim that, in spite of all the exceptions, they constitute a chance of selection for talent. But horrible as the thought is that the world may one day be peopled with professors (laughter)—we would retire on to a desert island if such a thing were to happen (laughter)—it is still more horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with nothing

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but those little cogs, little men clinging to little jobs and striving towards bigger ones—a state of affairs which is to be seen once more, as in the Egyptian records, playing an ever-increasing part in the spirit of our present administrative system, and specially of its offspring, the students. This passion for bureaucracy, as we have heard it expressed here, is enough to drive one to despair. It is as if in politics the spectre of timidity—which has in any case always been rather a good standby for the German—were to stand alone at the helm; as if we were deliberately to become men who need ‘order’ and nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it. That the world should know no men but these: it is in such an evolution that we are already caught up, and the great question is therefore not how we can promote and hasten it, but what can we oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this parcelling-out of the soul, from this supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life. The answer to this question to-day clearly does not lie here.

We should rather ask ourselves now, what are the social political prospects under this advancing bureaucracy which you so passionately applaud. Gentlemen, I could not but shake my head at the illusion which seems to have possessed all of you here that, when the private employer has been replaced to the fullest possible extent by the state or municipal official, the result will be anything other than the administration of state authority from the employer’s point of view. The officials now have to reckon with the same annoyances and petty quarrels which daily faced the private employer with his workers, and nobody will try to make us believe that social politics will benefit. It is always the employees, the officials in private industry, who are more saintly than the saints, and they are far more difficult to deal with than the boss himself. What then will happen if state and municipal officials gain authority over ever-widening classes of workers? Will they acquire a greater sense of social politics by the inevitable continued friction with the workers’ organizations? (Hear, hear!) It was even thought that if the state were to take a share in the coalmining industry, and were to take over mines and enter the mining syndicate, this cartel would be run on social political lines; what, then, is the fate which will await the state if this wholesale surrender takes place? It

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would play the part, not of Siegfried, but of King Gunther with Brunhilde. (Laughter.)

It is common knowledge that the conditions in state-owned mines are the worst thing that exists in social politics. (Cries of 'Come, come!') And you can blame no man for it. If I were in such a position I would also find it impossible in the long run to prevent such conditions arising; if I had the daily friction with workers, either individually or in organizations, so that I could feel my temper rising at the eternal interference with my carefully worked-out plans, and wished I could send all these people to the devil; for I would be underestimating myself as a true bureaucrat if I did not claim to know, much better than these blockheads, what was good for them. In such quarrels the minds of the public officials, who rightly enough consider themselves to be far more intelligent than their workers, will work on the lines that I have just described. However capable and farsighted these gentlemen may be, they become brittle in the daily clash of interests; I also would become brittle and draw the same conclusions as I have imputed to them. (Hear, hear! Bravo!) Only a community which is independent of the employers' outlook can, in the long run, cultivate 'social politics'. I will not discuss to-day what conclusions are to be drawn from this. I only wished to challenge the unquestioning idolization of bureaucracy.

The principle of ever-widening nationalization and communalization has found greatly varying degrees of expression in the *Verein für Socialpolitik* since the beginning of its history. Such an all-round nationalizer as Privy Councillor Wagner, has, indeed, been somewhat of a solitary figure—I might almost say, a rarity—in our Society. (Cry of 'On the contrary!') I know there have been others. I know that among them was our venerable teacher, Professor von Schmoller, although he was much more cautious and, as he reminded me a little while ago, viewed with great scepticism the nationalization of the French railways, to take an example. Be that as it may, an essential factor in the predilection for bureaucracy which exists among us in varying degrees, is a purely moral sentiment; namely, the belief in the unshakability of the undoubtedly high moral standard of German officialdom. I personally consider such matters also in the light of the international power-rank and cultural development of a nation. Here, however, the 'ethical' aspect of the machine to-day plays a decidedly

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minor part. Admittedly, in so far as they encourage the precise functioning of the machine, the 'ethics' are valuable to the mechanism as such. But my impression is this: This 'corrupt' civil service of France, this corrupt civil service of America, this much abused 'nightwatchmen's government' of England—how, in point of fact, do these nations fare? How, for instance, do they fare in the realm of foreign politics? Are we the ones who have made progress in this field, or who has? Democratically governed nations with an undoubtedly partly corrupt officialdom have gained far more success in the world than our highly moral bureaucracy; and judging purely on the basis of 'realistic politics' and, furthermore, taking into consideration the 'power value' of the nations in the world—which for many of us is the ultimate value—then I ask: which kind of system—the expansion of private capital, coupled with a purely business officialdom which is more easily exposed to corruption; or state government through the highly moral, authoritarian and glorified German officialdom—which system to-day is the more 'efficient', to use an English expression? Nor can I acknowledge, with all due respect for the ethically upright mechanism of German bureaucracy, that it has to this day shown itself capable of doing as much for the greatness of our country as has the officialdom of other nations, divested of its celestial raiment, morally infinitely inferior, and associated with the—to many of us—so despicable profit motive of private capital. (Cries of Bravo! and applause.)¹

¹ Cf. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 412 sqq.

Appendix II

R. H. TAWNEY'S CRITICISM OF WEBER'S PROTESTANT ETHIC

W eber's essay gave rise to much discussion in Germany. Its main thesis—that Calvinism, and in particular English Puritanism, from which nearly all his illustrations are drawn, played a part of preponderant importance in creating moral and political conditions favourable to the growth of capitalist enterprise—appears to be accepted by Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, pp. 704 *sqq.* It is submitted to a critical analysis by Brentano (*Die Anfänge des modernen Kapitalismus*, 1916, pp. 117–57), who dissents from many of Weber's conclusions. Weber's essay is certainly one of the most fruitful examinations of the relations between religion and social theory which has appeared, and I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to it, in particular with reference to its discussion of the economic application given by some Puritan writers to the idea expressed by the word 'calling'. At the same time, there are several points on which Weber's arguments appear to me to be one-sided and over-strained, and on which Brentano's criticisms of it seem to me to be sound.

Thus (i), as was perhaps inevitable in an essay dealing with economic and social thought, as distinct from changes in economic and social organization, Weber seems to me to explain by reference to moral and intellectual influences developments which have their principal explanation in another region altogether. There was plenty of the 'capitalist spirit' in the fifteenth-century Venice and Florence, or in South Germany and Flanders, for the simple reason that these areas were the greatest commercial and financial centres of the age, though all were, at least nominally, Catholic. The development of capitalism in Holland and England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was due, not to the fact that they were Protestant powers, but to large economic movements, in particular the discoveries and

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the results which flowed from them. Of course material and psychological changes went together, and of course the second reacted on the first. But it seems a little artificial to talk as though capitalist enterprise could not appear till religious changes had produced a capitalist spirit. It would be equally true, and equally one-sided, to say that the religious changes were purely the result of economic movements.

(ii) Weber ignores, or at least touches too lightly on, intellectual movements, which were favourable to the growth of business enterprise and to an individualistic attitude towards economic relations, but which had little to do with religion. The political thought of the Renaissance was one; as Brentano points out, Machiavelli was at least as powerful a solvent of traditional ethical restraints as Calvin. The speculations of business men and economists on money, prices, and foreign exchanges were a second. Both contributed to the temper of single-minded concentration on pecuniary gain, which Weber understands by the capitalist spirit.

(iii) He appears to greatly over-simplify Calvinism itself. In the first place, he apparently ascribes to the English Puritans of the seventeenth century the conception of social ethics held by Calvin and his immediate followers. In the second place, he speaks as though all English Puritans in the seventeenth century held much the same view of social duties and expediency. Both suggestions are misleading. On the one hand, the Calvinists of the sixteenth century (including English Puritans) were believers in a rigorous discipline, and the individualism ascribed not unjustly to the Puritan movement in its later phases would have horrified them. The really significant question is that of the causes of the change from the one standpoint to the other, a question which Weber appears to ignore. On the other hand, there were within seventeenth-century Puritanism a variety of elements, which held widely different views as to social policy. As Cromwell discovered, there was no formula which would gather Puritan aristocrats and Levellers, landowners and diggers, merchants and artisans, buff-coat and his general, into the fold of a single social theory. The issue between divergent doctrines was fought out within the Puritan movement itself. Some won; others lost.


Both the 'capitalist spirit' and 'Protestant ethics', therefore, were a good deal more complex than Weber seems to imply. What is true and valuable in his essay is his insistence that the commercial classes

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in seventeenth-century England were the standard-bearers of a particular conception of social expediency, which was markedly different from that of the more conservative elements in society—the peasants, the craftsmen, and many landed gentry—and that that conception found expression in religion, in politics, and, not least, in social and economic conduct and policy.¹

¹ Cf. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and Rise of Capitalism*, Pelican edition, pp. 283 sqq. I am deeply grateful to Professor Tawney and the Penguin Books Ltd. for allowing me to reprint these pages.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THOSE GAINFULLY OCCUPIED IN GERMANY—1882-1925



Appendix

POLITICAL PARTIES

A. DIE MANDATSSSTARKE DER PARTEIEN

	1871		1874		1877		1878		1881	
Konservativ	57	549	22	360	40	526	59	750	50	831
Reichspartei (Freikons.)	37	346	33	376	38	427	57	786	28	379
Antisemiten	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Land- und Bauernbund ³	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Liberales Reichspartei	30	274	34	54	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nationalliberal	125	1171	155	1543	128	1470	99	1331	47	747
Linksliberal ⁵	46	342	49	448	35	418	26	385	106	1079
Deutsche Volkspartei	1	19	1	22	4	45	3	66	9	103
Zentrum	63	724	91	1446	93	1341	94	1328	100	1182
Welfen ⁶	7	61	4	92	4	86	10	100	10	87
Polen und Dänen ⁷	14	195	15	218	15	234	15	226	20	209
Elsass-Lothringer	—	—	15	235	15	200	15	179	15	153
Sozialdemokraten	2	124	9	352	12	493	9	437	12	312
Andere	—	76	—	45	—	46	—	16	—	15
zusammen:	382	3888	397	5190	397	5401	397	5761	397	5098
Wahlbeteiligung %		51		61		60		63		56

¹ Quellen: Statist. Jahrb. f.d. Deutsche Reich 1887, S.146; 1913, S. 328; 1919, S. 234. In der 1. Spalte steht jeweils die Mandatszahl, in der 2. die Stimmzahl des 1. Wahlgangs (in Tausenden abgerundet). Veränderungen während der Legislaturperiode wurden nicht berücksichtigt.

² Darunter 5, bzw. 10 Angehörige d. Wirtschaftl. Vereinigung.

³ Bund der Landwirte 1898–1907, Bayrischer Bauernbund 1893–1912, Deutscher Bauernbund 1912.

IV

IN THE REICHSTAG

IM REICHSTAG 1871-1918¹

1884		1887		1890		1893		1898		1903		1907		1912	
78	861	80	1147	73	895	72	1038	56	859	54	949	60	1060	43	1126
28	388	41	736	20	482	28	438	23	344	21	333	24	472	14	367
—	—	1	12	5	48	16	264	13	284	11	245	21 ²	353	13 ²	357
—	—	—	—	—	—	4	66	11	251	8	230	9	195	4	78
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
51	997	99	1678	42	1178	53	997	46	971	51	1317	54	1631	45	1663
67	997	32	973	66	1160	37	925	41	754	31	812	42	1095	} 42	1497
7	96	—	89	10	148	11	167	8	109	6	91	7	139		
99	1182	98	1516	106	1342	96	1469	102	1455	100	1875	105	2180	91	1997
11	96	4	113	11	113	7	102	9	105	6	94	1	78	5	85
17	216	14	232	17	261	20	254	15	260	17	363	21	469	19	459
15	166	15	234	10	101	8	115	10	107	9	102	7	104	9	162
24	550	11	763	35	1427	44	1787	56	2107	81	3011	43	3259	110	4250
—	13	2	48	2	75	1	59	7	107	2	67	3	209	2	122
397	5683	397	7541	397	7229	397	7674	397	7753	397	9496	397	11263	397	12208
	60		77		71		72		68		76		84		85

⁴ Die Abg. treten teils zu den Freikonservativen, teils zu den National-liberalen über.

⁵ Deutsche Fortschrittspartei 1871-81, Liberale Vereinigung 1881 (46 Abg.), Deutsche Freisinnige Partei 1884-90, Freisinnige Vereinigung u. Freisinnige Volkspartei 1893-1907 (13+24, 12+29, 9+21, 14+28 Abg.) Nationalsoziale 1903 (1 Abg.), Fortschrittliche Volkspartei 1912.

⁶ 1871-84 schloss sich die Mehrzahl der Abg. dem Zentrum an.

⁷ Die Dänen hatten 1881: 2, sonst je 1 Abg. (14-20000 Stimmen).

Cf. W. Mommsen und G. Franz, *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme*, Heft 2. *Im deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871-1918*, Leipsic, 1932.

**B. DIE DEUTSCHEN PARTEIEN IM REICHSTAGE VON
1919 BIS 1930**

	Mandate						Stimmenzahl (in Tsd.)	
	Nat. Vers.		Mai	Dez.			1928	1930
	1919	1920	1924	1924	1928	1930		
N.S.D.A.P.	—	—	32	14	12	107	810	6406
D.N.V.P.	44	71	95	111	78	41	4380	2458
Landvolk	—	—	—	—	10	19	582	1108
Christl. Soz. Volksd.	—	—	—	—	—	14	—	870
Kons. Volkspartei	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	291
Dtsch. Hann. Partei	1	5	5	4	3	3	195	167
Volksrechtspartei	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	271
Volksnat. Reichs-Ver.	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—
Wirtschaftspartei	—	—	10	17	23	23	1395	1362
D.V.P.	19	65	45	51	45	30	2678	1577
Bayr. Volkspartei	—	21	16	19	16	19	945	1059
Zentrum	91	64	65	69	62	68	3711	4127
D.D.P. bzw. Staatsp.	75	39	28	32	25	14	1504	1322
S.P.D.	165	102	100	131	153	143	9151	8575
U.S.P.D.	22	84	—	—	—	—	—	—
K.P.D.	—	4	62	45	54	77	3263	4590
Andere Parteien	6	4	14	—	8	9	2126	2028
Gesamtzahl	423	459	472	493	491	577	30730	34950

Cf. S. Neumann, *Die deutschen Parteien*, Berlin, 1932.

Bibliography and Notes

The present book is a study in sociology of politics. Its findings are based on Max Weber's works and letters.

A full bibliography of Max Weber's works is to be found on pp. 715 sqq. of Marianne Weber's *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*, Tuebingen 1926. I mention here only his most important works:

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Much of Weber's correspondence is still unpublished, e.g. his letters to Georg Simmel and to Robert Michels. Yet for the purpose of the present study the biographical material seemed sufficient in providing us with the main trends of his life and work. It was *not* our intention to write a biography of Max Weber.

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² Marianne Weber, *Lebensbild*, p. 611.

II. TOWARDS EARLY MASTERY

¹ *Jugendbriefe*, p. 3.

² *Lebensbild*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 520 sq.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 522 sq.

⁶ *Politische Schriften*, p. 74.

⁷ See my book *Political Thought in France: from Sieyès to Sorel*, London, 1943.

⁸ *Jugendbriefe*, p. 41.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 366 sq.

¹⁰ Rilke, *Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge*, vol. ii, p. 170.

¹¹ *Jugendbriefe*, p. 121.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁸ For the best discussion of Gneist's influence on German State Law see J. Redlich, *Englische Lokalverwaltung*, Leipsic, 1901, pp. 745 sqq.

¹⁹ *Lebensbild*, p. 121.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²³ *Jugendbriefe*, pp. 298 sq.

²⁴ Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, pp. 444 sq. and p. 468.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 456.

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²⁸ Cf. particularly *Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' der soziologischen und*

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ökonomischen Wissenschaften (1917) in *Gesammelte Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 451 sqq.

²⁹ Cf. Spinoza, *Ethica*, Pars V, Propos. iii: 'Affectus, cui passio est, desinit esse passio, simulatque eius claram et distinctam formamus ideam.'

³⁰ *Jugendbriefe*, pp. 251 sqq.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 323 sq.

³³ He was Chancellor of the German Reich from 1890 to 1894.

³⁴ *Jugendbriefe*, pp. 345 sqq.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

³⁶ *Lebensbild*, p. 190.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

III. FROM ECONOMICS TO SOCIOLOGY

¹ Cf. W. Windelband, *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*, Strasburg, 1894, und H. Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, Tuebingen, 1910.

² Cf. Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, Tuebingen, 1902.

³ *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik*, in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, pp. 8 sqq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17 sq.

⁹ Cf. Elie Halévy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism*, pp. 499 sq.

¹⁰ *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik*, in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Lebensbild*, pp. 219–28.

¹⁵ *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, p. 25.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 sq.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

²⁰ *Lebensbild*, p. 236.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

²² It would be a fascinating task to implement our interpretation of Weber's 'political sociology' by a thorough analysis of his 'sociology of law' (*Rechtssoziologie*; cf. particularly *Economics and Society*, pp. 387–513). After careful consideration I have refrained from this task, being only a dilettante in the field of jurisprudence. I felt competent to illus-

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trate Weber's political sociology by referring to disciplines like history, economics, philosophy, and political science, but the legal science is—anyway for the time being—beyond my competence.

I have suggested in the text that Weber was a highly trained lawyer. As such Roman Law—and the history of Roman Law—shaped his mind to a considerable extent. I would not hesitate to say that his fundamental concept of 'rationalization' is due to a large extent to the 'rationalism' of Roman Law. The question which in this context would have to be examined is, how far Roman Law and its direct and indirect derivations have contributed to the rationalized legal forms of our modern societies. To answer this question would have involved me in studies which might have held up this book for a considerable period. Moreover I am not at all certain whether Weber has not overrated the process of legal rationalization, as far as England is concerned: '*The traditional position of the English judge may in all probability be very much shaken in the near future by the progress of bureaucratization and the further development of legal formalism.*' (*Economics and Society*, p. 512.) It seems to me that here, too, he has failed to understand the strength of British 'political' traditions. If this interpretation is justified, and I have no doubt it is, the general trend of his sociology of Law is as much open to doubt as his sociology of the State which is the central subject of this study.

Finally I should like to express the hope that a lawyer who happens to read this book may feel encouraged to criticize Weber from the point of view of a universal sociology of jurisprudence.

²³ Cf. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 1 sqq.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 146 sqq.

²⁵ Cf. *Lebensbild*, p. 716.

²⁶ On de Tocqueville see my book: *Prophet of the Mass Age. A study of Alexis de Tocqueville*, pp. 295 sqq.

²⁷ *Lebensbild*, p. 295.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

³² Cf. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons. With a Foreword by R. H. Tawney, London, 1930, and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, now Pelican edition. See *Religion and Rise of Capitalism*, pp. 285 sqq., where Tawney gives a masterly (and brief) summary and criticism of Weber's arguments. (See Appendix II.)

³³ Max Weber, *Protestant Ethic*, p. 45.

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 181 sq.

³⁵ *Lebensbild*, p. 317.

³⁶ Cf. *Protestant Ethic*, p. 182.

³⁷ Cf. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 227–363.

³⁸ Cf. *Protestant Ethic*, pp. 15–51.

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- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 16. sq.
- ⁴¹ Cf. my edition of Marx's early writings: *Der Historische Materialismus. Die Frühschriften von Karl Marx*, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1931.
- ⁴² 'Alle politischen Gebilde sind Gewaltgebilde.' *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 619.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 618.
- ⁴⁴ Lord Acton, *The History of Freedom*, p. 151.
- ⁴⁵ Weber, *Russlands Uebergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus*, *Archiv* etc., XXIII p. 306.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 395.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 397.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 398.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 398 sq.
- ⁵⁰ *Archiv*, etc. XXII, p. 347.
- ⁵¹ *Politische Schriften*, pp. 451 sq.
- ⁵² Cf. Appendix.
- ⁵³ Cf. Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei*, Vols. i-viii, Koeln, 1927 and later.
- ⁵⁴ *Politische Schriften*, pp. 455 sq.
- ⁵⁵ With regard to King Edward VII's role in foreign affairs see now R. C. K. Ensor's admirable *England 1870-1914*, Oxford, s.a., pp. 567 sq.
- ⁵⁶ *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 409 sq. See also my book *Political Thought: The European Tradition*, where I have previously quoted the foregoing passage and attempted to put it into the general context of *Political Thought in Germany*, pp. 321 sqq.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. my *Political Thought: The European Tradition*, pp. 437 sqq., and J. P. Mayer, *Marx-Engels und der kapitalistische Staat*, Berlin, 1931, pp. 23 sq.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. J. P. Mayer, *Eduard Bernstein und der Revisionismus. Neue Blätter für den Sozialismus*, 1933, pp. 35 sqq.
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *Diskussionsreden auf den Tagungen des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, in Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 394-430.
- ⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 431-49.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 435.
- ⁶² Cf. *Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie*, in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 403 sqq.
- ⁶³ For a comprehensive account of Weber's methodology see Schelting, A. von, *Max Webers Wissenschaftslehre*, Tuebingen, 1934.
- ⁶⁴ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, pp. 1-30. This first chapter of his main work is entitled: *Soziologische Grundbegriffe*.
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, pp. 1 sqq., and *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 3rd ed., 1909, vol. i, pp. 52-188.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 182.

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- ¹ *Kriegsalmanach*, 1915. Insel Verlag, Leipsic, pp. 14 sq.
- ² *Politische Schriften*, p. 458.
- ³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 453 sq.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 459.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 460.
- ⁹ Cf. Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe*, with an Introduction by W. J. Ashley, London, 1916.
- ¹⁰ *Politische Schriften*, p. 461.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 469.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 469 sq.
- ¹³ Cf. *Deutsche Reichsverfassung* (April 16th, 1871): 'Jedes Mitglied des Bundesrates hat das Recht, im Reichstage zu erscheinen, und muss dasselbst auf Verlangen jederzeit gehört werden, um die Ansichten seiner Regierung zu vertreten, auch dann, wenn dieselben von der Majorität des Bundesrates nicht adoptiert worden sind. Niemand kann gleichzeitig Mitglied des Bundesrates und des Reichstages sein.'
- ¹⁴ *Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland*, in *Politische Schriften*, pp. 126-260.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 138.
- ¹⁶ Cf. E. Troeltsch, *Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der Neuzeit*, in *Die Christliche Religion*, Leipsic, 1906, pp. 280 sq. See also Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, vol. ii, pp. 547 sqq.
- ¹⁷ Otto Hintze, *Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk*, Berlin., 1916, p. 591.
- ¹⁸ *Politische Schriften*, pp. 139 sq.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- ²⁰ Cf. J. P. Mayer, *The New Middle Classes*, in *The Dublin Review*, January 1941. See also *Der neue Mittelstand*, by E. Lederer, and J. Marschak in *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik: Die gesellschaftliche Schichtung im Kapitalismus*, Tuebingen, 1926.
- ²¹ *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 167.
- ²² *Politische Schriften*, p. 162.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p. 167.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.
- ²⁶ Jeremiah, xv, 19.
- ²⁷ *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, III, p. 286.
- ²⁸ *Lebensbild*, p. 625.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ *Gesammelte Schriften zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, pp. 492-518. Also published as a pamphlet.

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- ³¹ *Politische Schriften*, p. 488.
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- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 508.
- ³⁵ *Politische Schriften*, p. 476.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 477.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 477.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

V. 'REVOLUTION' AND REPUBLIC

- ¹ *Politische Schriften*, pp. 481 sq.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 482.
- ³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 480.
- ⁴ *Deutschlands künftige Staatsform in Politische Schriften*, pp. 341–376; also published as a pamphlet.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 346.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 347.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 351.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 353.
- ⁹ *Das neue Deutschland*, in *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, p. 377.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹¹ Cf. W. Ziegler, *Die deutsche Nationalversammlung 1919–20 und ihr Werk*, Berlin, 1932 (with important bibliography); *Die Verfassung des deutschen Reiches*, vol. ii, August 1919. Mit Erläuterungen und Sachregister von G. Anschuetz, Berlin, 1921. *Grundriss des Reichsstaatsrechts* von F. Giese, Bonn, 1922; H. Oppenheimer, *The Constitution of the Weimar Republic*, London, 1923. H. Preuss, *Staat, Recht und Freiheit. Aus 40 Jahren deutscher Politik und Geschichte*, Tuebingen, 1926.
- ¹² *Lebensbild*, p. 651.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ Cf. Ziegler, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- ¹⁵ See Article 34 of the Weimar Constitution.
- ¹⁶ Cf. Prinz Max von Baden, *Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, p. 128.
- ¹⁷ Cf. *Politische Schriften*, pp. 361 sqq.
- ¹⁸ Cf. Brogan, *The American Political System*, 2nd ed., 1943. Brogan, *Politics and Law in the United States*. H. J. Laski, *The American Presidency*.
- ¹⁹ Cf. *Politische Schriften*, pp. 390 sqq.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 391.
- ²¹ 'If public order and security are seriously disturbed or endangered within the *Reich*, the *Reich's* President may take all necessary steps for their restoration, intervening, if need be, with the aid of the armed forces. . . . ' Bruening and Hitler—the latter until Hindenburg's death in 1934—maintained their position as Chancellor of the *Reich* only by virtue of Article 48, § 2. Cf. Carl Schmitt, *Die Diktatur*, Munich, 1928.

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Cf. also *Dritte Notverordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zur Bekämpfung politischer Ausschreitungen vom 6. Oktober 1931*. Reclam edition.

²² To illustrate the point I have made in the text, I should like to quote two passages from Maitland's introduction to Otto von Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 1900, p. x:

'There was no likelihood that the England which the Norman duke had subdued and surveyed would be either *Staatenbund* or *Bundesstaat*. . . . This, if it diminished our expenditure of blood and treasure—an expenditure that impoverishes—diminished also our expenditure of thought—an expenditure that enriches—and facilitated (might this not be said?) a certain thoughtlessness or poverty of ideas. The State that Englishmen knew was a singularly unicellular state, and at a critical time they were not too well equipped with tried and traditional thoughts which would meet the case of Ireland or some communities, commonwealths, corporations in America which seemed to have wills—and hardly fictitious wills—of their own, and which became states and United States. The medieval Empire laboured under the weight of an incongruously simple theory so soon as lawyers were teaching that the Kaiser was the Princeps of Justinian's law-books. The modern and multicellular British State—often perhaps harmlessly called an Empire—may prosper without a theory, but does not suggest and, were we serious in our talk of sovereignty, would hardly tolerate, a theory that is simple enough and insular enough, and yet withal imperially Roman enough, to deny an essentially statelike character to those "self-governing colonies", communities, commonwealths, which are knit and welded into a larger sovereign whole.'

p. xvi: 'But that famous historical school (the German historical law school with which Weber through Gneist and the economist Kries is linked up) was not only a school of historically minded Romanists. It was also the cradle of Germanism. Eichhorn and Grimm stood by Savigny's side. . . . The last shadow of political unity had vanished and had left behind a "geographical expression", a mere collective name for some allied states. Many of them were rather estates than states; most of them were too small to be the Fatherland. Much else besides blood, iron, and song went to the remaking of Germany. The idea of a Common Law would not die. A common legislation there might not be, but a Common Law there was, and a hope that the law of Germany might some day be natively German was awakened.'

For more recent expositions of the Anglo-American attitude towards the 'power-political' State see H. J. Laski, *Grammar of Politics*, London, 1925, pp. 41 sq.; and R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, Oxford, 1928, pp. 220 sqq.

²³ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 483.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 483 sq.

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- ²⁶ Ibid., p. 484.
- ²⁷ Ibid., *Zum Thema* "Kriegsschuld", pp. 381-9.
- ²⁸ Ibid., p. 382.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 384.
- ³⁰ *Lebensbild*, p. 667.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 669.
- ³² Op. cit., p. 33.
- ³³ Cf. Birdsall, *Versailles. Twenty Years After*. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-39*. E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*.
- ³⁴ Cf. Stolper, *This Age of Fable*, p. 276.
- ³⁵ Cf. R. M. Rilke, *Briefe an eine junge Frau*, pp. 43 sqq.

VI. SCIENCE, VALUES, AND POLITICS

- ¹ *Lebensbild*, p. 709.
- ² Cf. *Gesammelte Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre*, pp. 524-55. The best critical discussion of this work of Weber's is to be found in Max Scheler, *Moralia*, Leipsic, 1923, under the title *Weltanschauungslehre, Soziologie und Weltanschauungssetzung*, pp. 1 sqq.
- ³ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, pp. 396-450.
- ⁴ Cf. *Gesammelte Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre*, p. 553.
- ⁵ Cf. Pierre Viénot, *Incertitudes Allemandes*, where on pp. 94 sqq. a brilliant analysis of a certain type of German sociology is to be found which purports to follow Max Weber.
- ⁶ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 397.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Ibid., p. 422.
- ⁹ Ibid., p. 423.
- ¹⁰ Cf. my book *Prophet of the Mass Age. A Study of Alexis de Tocqueville*.
- ¹¹ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 438.
- ¹² Ibid., p. 439.
- ¹³ Ibid., p. 443.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 444.
- ¹⁵ I should like to refer to the admirable discussion of Weber's political philosophy by Friedrich Meinecke in *Staat und Persönlichkeit*, Berlin, 1933, where on p. 164 Weber's Machiavellism is fully appreciated—and refuted. For recent discussion of Machiavelli and Machiavellism, see Charles Benoist, *Machiavel*, Paris, 1934; *Le Machiavélisme: avant Machiavel*, Paris, 1907; *Le Machiavélisme: Après Machiavel*, Paris, 1936. Cf. also H. Butterfield *The Statecraft of Machiavelli*, London, 1940.
- ¹⁶ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 445.
- ¹⁷ *Lebensbild*, p. 339.
- ¹⁸ *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, p. 447.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 448 sq.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 450.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

¹ For a critical discussion of Rickert's philosophy see Max Scheler, *Deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutsches Leben der Gegenwart*, 1922, pp. 165 sqq.

² Cf. Ernst Troeltsch, *Spektatorbriefe*, pp. 300 sqq. Tuebingen, 1924.

³ For a brilliant exposition of a *functional* approach to the problems of reconstruction see David Mitrany, *A working Peace System*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford, 1943.

⁴ It is perhaps opportune to compare the findings of our analysis of the structure of German politics with a recent publication by a Chatham House Study Group on the *Problem of Germany*. Three observations suggest themselves:

(1) The report speaks rather vaguely of a German 'war party' without any attempt to enter into a detailed analysis of German class structures. The sociological method of the report is, therefore, weak and ambiguous.

(2) It seems that the authors suggest a dismemberment of Germany (cf. p. 31). Apart from the question whether such a procedure might not have a very doubtful psychological effect on future generations of Germans, an effect which the report does not consider, the problem arises whether the tentatively proposed separation of the Rhineland or East Prussia is not a cloak for a division of 'spheres of interest' between Soviet Russia and the Western Allies. The authors are not clear on this point in so far as they do not suggest such a division of spheres of interest openly. In our view, nothing could be more detrimental for the future than to pursue such a policy as it is evident that the industrial potential in the west which, separated from Germany, would come under Western influence, is economically more powerful than the industrial potential of the east.

(3) In fact the real problems arising out of the Anglo-Soviet war alliance with regard to the 'German problem' are politely explained away. Thus we read on page 74: 'Russian influence may be very great in view of the part which Russia is playing in Germany's military defeat, and especially if there is a Communist revolution in Germany. On the other hand, the particular stimulus arising from the novelty of the Russian social and political techniques, which no doubt contributed to the attraction exercised by Russia after the last war, will no longer be so strong. It has been the habit of the Germans to consider themselves as teachers of the Russians, rather than the reverse.' This may be wishful academic thinking, but does not help to evolve a policy which England and Soviet Russia ought to have ready, once Nazi Germany is defeated on the field of battle.

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